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The winner-take-all dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Kikuchi, Kazuya

    (World Language and Society Education Center, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

  • Koriyama, Yukio

    (Department of Economics, CREST, Ecole Polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

We consider collective decision making when society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a technique for asymptotic analysis and show Pareto dominance of the proportional rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Kikuchi, Kazuya & Koriyama, Yukio, 2023. "The winner-take-all dilemma," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:5248
    as

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    Cited by:

    1. Yoichi Hizen & Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama & Takehito Masuda, 2024. "Jumping on the bandwagon and off the Titanic: an experimental study of turnout in two-tier voting," Papers 2408.00265, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Representative democracy; winner-take-all rule; proportional rule; prisoner's dilemma;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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