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Shinsuke Kambe

Personal Details

First Name:Shinsuke
Middle Name:
Last Name:Kambe
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pka1663
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://www.univ.gakushuin.ac.jp/eco/en/about/economics/member/shinsukekambe/

Affiliation

Faculty of Economics
Gakushuin University

Tokyo, Japan
http://www.gakushuin.ac.jp/univ/eco/
RePEc:edi:fegakjp (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Kambe, Shinsuke, 2019. "An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  2. Shinsuke Kambe, 2017. "Commitment and two-person bargaining games," Gakushuin Economic Papers, Gakushuin University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 54(2), pages 105-131.
  3. Shinsuke Kambe, 2009. "Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 499-520, November.
  4. Shinsuke Kambe, 2006. "Subjective Evaluation In Agency Contracts," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 121-140, March.
  5. Shinsuke Kambe, 1999. "When is There a Unique Equilibrium in Less Structured Bargaining?," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 50(3), pages 321-342, September.
  6. Kambe, Shinsuke, 1999. "Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 217-237, August.
  7. Kambe, Shinsuke & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1990. "Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games : Two-principal case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 329-332, December.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Kambe, Shinsuke, 2019. "An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.

    Cited by:

    1. Maria Betto & Matthew W. Thomas, 2021. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Spillovers," Papers 2106.08496, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
    2. Li, Hongcheng, 2019. "Multi-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 109511, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Aug 2021.
    3. Ma, Zizhen, 2023. "Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

  2. Shinsuke Kambe, 2009. "Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 499-520, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2019. "Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 389-399, May.

  3. Shinsuke Kambe, 2006. "Subjective Evaluation In Agency Contracts," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 121-140, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Marchegiani, Lucia & Reggiani, Tommaso & Rizzolli, Matteo, 2016. "Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 183-197.
    2. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.
    3. Ishiguro, Shingo & Yasuda, Yosuke, 2023. "Moral hazard and subjective evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).

  4. Shinsuke Kambe, 1999. "When is There a Unique Equilibrium in Less Structured Bargaining?," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 50(3), pages 321-342, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2019. "Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 389-399, May.
    2. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2020. "Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash Demand Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 639-650, June.

  5. Kambe, Shinsuke, 1999. "Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 217-237, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    3. Goerlach, Joseph-Simon & Motz, Nicolas, 2024. "A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-Cooperative Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 18843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Vincent Boitier, 2015. "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: a Note on the Role of Reference Points," Post-Print hal-00878107, HAL.
    5. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2021. "A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 239-269, June.
    6. Britz, V., 2010. "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Research Memorandum 056, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    7. Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining," SITE Working Paper Series 8, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    8. Mehmet Ekmekci & Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities," Papers 2105.01581, arXiv.org.
    9. Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
    10. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2011. "A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 1-27, May.
    11. Lu, Yang K., 2013. "Optimal policy with credibility concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2007-2032.
    12. Sanktjohanser, Anna, 2022. "Optimally Stubborn," TSE Working Papers 22-1367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    13. Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly," Discussion Paper 201-012, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Jonas Send & Marco Serena, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    15. Chung, Bobby W. & Wood, Daniel H., 2019. "Threats and promises in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 37-50.
    16. Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.
    17. Georgiadis, George & Kim, Youngsoo & Kwon, H. Dharma, 2022. "The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 171-185.
    18. Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly," Other publications TiSEM bece5078-67ec-458b-807c-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Drew Fudenberg & Ying Gao & Harry Pei, 2020. "A Reputation for Honesty," Papers 2011.07159, arXiv.org.
    20. George Georgiadis & Youngsoo Kim & H. Dharma Kwon, 2021. "The Absence of Attrition in a War of Attrition under Complete Information," Papers 2110.12013, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    21. Li, Hongcheng, 2019. "Multi-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 109511, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Aug 2021.
    22. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
    23. Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    24. Roman Inderst, 2005. "Bargaining with a Possibly Committed Seller," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(4), pages 927-944, October.
    25. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
    26. Ilkka Leppänen, 2020. "Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 783-799, April.
    27. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Competition or collusion? Negotiating discounts off posted prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 341-354, April.
    28. Britz, Volker, 2013. "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 345-351.
    29. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    30. Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2018. "Hierarchical experimentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 365-404.
    31. Vincent Boitier, 2015. "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: a Note on the Role of Reference Points," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00878107, HAL.
    32. Segendorff, Björn, 2001. "Patience and Ultimatum in Bargaining," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 461, Stockholm School of Economics.
    33. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    34. Amoros, Pablo & Moreno, Bernardo, 2006. "Bargaining and waning commitments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 417-422, September.
    35. Ellingsen, Tore & Miettinen, Topi, 2014. "Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 353-366.
    36. Anna Sanktjohanser, 2020. "Optimally Stubborn," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2255, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    37. Tsoy, Anton, 2018. "Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    38. Britz, V., 2010. "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    39. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 2000. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    40. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    41. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.
    42. Hajime Kobayashi & Hideo Suehiro, 2008. "Leadership by Confidence in Teams," Discussion Papers 2008-35, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    43. Kobayashi, Hajime & Suehiro, Hideo, 2008. "Leadership by Confidence in Teams," MPRA Paper 10717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    44. Ma, Zizhen, 2023. "Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    45. Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly," Other publications TiSEM 9d3c763b-0e8d-47c5-8b47-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    46. Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2003. "Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 357-374, June.
    47. Basak, Deepal, 2023. "Bargaining under almost complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    48. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics.
    49. Li, Duozhe, 2011. "Commitment and compromise in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 203-211, February.

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