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Commitment and two-person bargaining games

Author

Listed:
  • Shinsuke Kambe

Abstract

ゲーム理論で交渉を分析する際には，それをどうモデル化するかが課題となる。この小論では，２人交渉ゲームのモデル化の主要な要因として，コミットメントに焦点を当てる。そして，コミットメントの観点から交渉理論を展望することで，交渉についてのゲーム理論的分析の進展を，定式化の観点まで掘り下げて確認することを目的とする。具体的には，これまでの２人交渉ゲームの理論分析の中で，コミットメントがどのように仮定されてきたかを整理する。そして，主要な交渉モデルをコミットメントの観点から再検討することで，それらのモデルにおける交渉力と交渉における非効率性についての理論的予測について，妥当性を評価する。

Suggested Citation

  • Shinsuke Kambe, 2017. "Commitment and two-person bargaining games," Gakushuin Economic Papers, Gakushuin University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 54(2), pages 105-131.
    • Handle: RePEc:abc:gakuep:54-2-3
    as

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    File URL: http://www.gakushuin.ac.jp/univ/eco/gakkai/pdf_files/keizai_ronsyuu/contents/contents2017/5402/5402kambe/5402kambe.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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