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Tibor Heumann

Personal Details

First Name:Tibor
Middle Name:
Last Name:Heumann
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:phe753
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://www.tiborheumann.com/

Affiliation

Instituto de Economía
Facultad de Ciencia Económicas y Administrativas
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Santiago, Chile
https://economia.uc.cl/
RePEc:edi:iepuccl (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Wang, Michael, 2024. "A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination," CEPR Discussion Papers 18793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Michael C. Wang, 2024. "Consumer-Optimal Segmentation in Multi-Product Markets," Papers 2401.12366, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
  3. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2023. "Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing," CEPR Discussion Papers 18374, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023. "The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing," Papers 2301.13827, arXiv.org.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023. "Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2375, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Papers 2212.03360, arXiv.org.
  7. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen & Sorokin, Constantine & Winter, Eyal, 2022. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 16858, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2021. "Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 16402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," CEPR Discussion Papers 15104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2015. "Information and Market Power," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001101, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2014. "Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000892, David K. Levine.
  12. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Information and Volatility," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1928R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2014.

Articles

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2022. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 371-388, September.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2021. "Information, market power, and price volatility," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 125-150, March.
  3. Heumann, Tibor, 2021. "Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  4. Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  5. Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 109-118.
  6. Heumann, Tibor, 2019. "An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  7. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2015. "Information and volatility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 427-465.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023. "Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2375, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

    Cited by:

    1. Philipp Strack & Kai Hao Yang, 2024. "Privacy‐Preserving Signals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(6), pages 1907-1938, November.

  2. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Papers 2212.03360, arXiv.org.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2338R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Andreas Haupt & Zoe Hitzig, 2023. "Opaque Contracts," Papers 2301.13404, arXiv.org.

  3. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2021. "Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 16402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2021. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2318, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  4. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," CEPR Discussion Papers 15104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Lou, Youcheng & Rahi, Rohit, 2023. "Information, market power and welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    2. Michail Anthropelos & Scott Robertson, 2024. "Strategic Informed Trading and the Value of Private Information," Papers 2404.08757, arXiv.org.
    3. Lou, Youcheng & Rahi, Rohit, 2023. "Information, market power and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120479, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Rahi, Rohit, 2021. "Information acquisition with heterogeneous valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    5. Jason Allen & Milena Wittwer, 2023. "Intermediary Market Power and Capital Constraints," Staff Working Papers 23-51, Bank of Canada.
    6. Lou, Youcheng & Rahi, Rohit, 2021. "Information, market power and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118843, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

  5. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2015. "Information and Market Power," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001101, UCLA Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Vives, Xavier & Manzano, Carolina, 2016. "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 11731, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Simplice Asongu & Nicholas Odhiambo, 2018. "Testing the Quiet Life Hypothesis in the African Banking Industry," Working Papers of the African Governance and Development Institute. 18/015, African Governance and Development Institute..
    3. Akcigit, Ufuk & Ates, Sina T., 2019. "Ten Facts on Declining Business Dynamism and Lessons from Endogenous Growth Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 13668, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Carroll, Gabriel, 2016. "Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 334-361.
    5. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor, 2015. "Information and Market Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 10791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Simplice Asongu & Nicholas Biekpe, 2017. "ICT, Information Asymmetry and Market Power in the African Banking Industry," Working Papers of the African Governance and Development Institute. 17/022, African Governance and Development Institute..

  6. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2014. "Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000892, David K. Levine.

    Cited by:

    1. Jess Benhabib & Pengfei Wang & Yi Wen, 2017. "Uncertainty and Sentiment-Driven Equilibria," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Kazuo Nishimura & Alain Venditti & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Sunspots and Non-Linear Dynamics, chapter 0, pages 281-304, Springer.
    2. Taneva, Ina A, 2015. "Information Design," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-50, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    3. Ina A Taneva, 2015. "Information Design," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 256, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

  7. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Information and Volatility," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1928R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2014.

    Cited by:

    1. Annie Liang & Xiaosheng Mu & Vasilis Syrgkanis, 2019. "Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition," Working Papers 2019-25, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 586-591, May.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2014.
    4. Chahrour, Ryan & Gaballo, Gaetano, 2017. "Learning from prices: amplication and business fluctuations," Working Paper Series 2053, European Central Bank.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Galeotti, Andrea & Golub, Benjamin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2018. "Targetting interventions in networks," Economics Discussion Papers 21698, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    7. Juan Passadore & Juan Xandri, 2019. "Robust Predictions in Dynamic Policy Games," 2019 Meeting Papers 1345, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," CEPR Discussion Papers 15104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Sushant Acharya & Jess Benhabib & Zhen Huo, 2017. "The Anatomy of Sentiment-Driven Fluctuations," NBER Working Papers 23136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Wu, Jieran, 2022. "Comments on “Sentiments and real business cycles”," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    11. Carroll, Gabriel, 2016. "Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 334-361.
    12. Martin Ellison & Andreas Tischbirek, 2018. "Beauty Contests and the Term Structure," Discussion Papers 1807, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    13. Eduardo Dávila & Cecilia Parlatore, 2019. "Volatility and Informativeness," NBER Working Papers 25433, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Smolin, Alex & Yamashita, Takuro, 2022. "Information Design in Concave Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 17066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor, 2015. "Information and Market Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 10791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Pavan, Alessandro & Vives, Xavier, 2015. "Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 407-426.
    17. Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Information Design in Smooth Games," Papers 2202.10883, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    18. G. Gaballo, 2017. "Price Dispersion, Private Uncertainty, and Endogenous Nominal Rigidities," Working papers 653, Banque de France.
    19. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
    20. Heumann, Tibor, 2021. "Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    21. Shen, Dehua & Li, Xiao & Zhang, Wei, 2018. "Baidu news information flow and return volatility: Evidence for the Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 127-133.
    22. Firouzi, Shahrokh & Wang, Xiangning, 2021. "The interrelationship between order flow, exchange rate, and the role of American economic news," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    23. Christian Myohl & Yannic Stucki, 2018. "Confidence and the Financial Accelerator," Diskussionsschriften dp1823, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.

Articles

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2022. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 371-388, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2338R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023. "Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2375, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Yang Cai & Yingkai Li & Jinzhao Wu, 2024. "Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2403.08145, arXiv.org.
    4. Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024. "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Papers 2412.12676, arXiv.org.
    5. Mateusz Mysliwski & Lars Nesheim & Simeon Duckworth, 2023. "Taking the biscuit: how Safari privacy policies affect online advertising," CeMMAP working papers 04/23, Institute for Fiscal Studies.

  2. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2021. "Information, market power, and price volatility," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 125-150, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Heumann, Tibor, 2021. "Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," CEPR Discussion Papers 15104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Lou, Youcheng & Rahi, Rohit, 2023. "Information, market power and welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    3. Lou, Youcheng & Rahi, Rohit, 2023. "Information, market power and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120479, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Lou, Youcheng & Rahi, Rohit, 2021. "Information, market power and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118843, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

  4. Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.

    Cited by:

    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Castro, Francisco & Weintraub, Gabriel, 2018. "The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 13018, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Alex Smolin, 2023. "Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes," Post-Print hal-04547880, HAL.
    3. Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022. "Shuttle Diplomacy," CEPR Discussion Papers 16934, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  5. Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 109-118.

    Cited by:

    1. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).

  6. Heumann, Tibor, 2019. "An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent LAMY & Manasa PATNAM & Michael VISSER, 2019. "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Working Papers 2019-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021. "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3256-3298, October.
    3. Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Post-Print hal-04382099, HAL.
    4. Paulo Fagandini & Ingemar Dierickx, 2023. "Computing Profit-Maximizing Bid Shading Factors in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 1009-1035, March.

  7. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2015. "Information and volatility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 427-465.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 22 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (20) 2013-12-15 2014-08-16 2014-11-01 2015-09-05 2015-09-26 2015-10-04 2018-11-12 2019-09-23 2021-05-31 2021-08-09 2021-09-27 2022-08-15 2023-01-23 2023-02-27 2023-09-04 2023-10-09 2024-02-05 2024-02-26 2024-03-18 2024-04-22. Author is listed
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (17) 2015-09-05 2015-09-26 2015-10-04 2018-11-12 2019-09-23 2021-05-31 2021-08-09 2021-09-27 2022-08-15 2023-01-23 2023-02-27 2023-09-04 2023-10-09 2024-02-05 2024-02-26 2024-03-18 2024-04-22. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (16) 2013-12-15 2014-08-16 2014-11-01 2015-09-05 2015-10-04 2018-11-12 2019-09-23 2021-05-31 2021-08-09 2021-09-27 2022-08-15 2023-01-23 2023-10-09 2024-02-05 2024-02-26 2024-04-22. Author is listed
  4. NEP-DES: Economic Design (10) 2018-11-12 2019-09-23 2021-05-31 2021-08-09 2021-09-27 2022-08-15 2023-01-23 2023-02-27 2023-09-04 2024-04-22. Author is listed
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (7) 2013-12-15 2014-03-08 2014-08-16 2014-11-01 2015-09-05 2015-09-26 2023-02-27. Author is listed
  6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (6) 2015-10-04 2018-11-12 2023-02-27 2023-09-04 2024-02-26 2024-03-18. Author is listed
  7. NEP-REG: Regulation (5) 2021-09-27 2023-02-27 2023-09-04 2024-02-26 2024-03-18. Author is listed
  8. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (3) 2019-09-23 2021-08-09 2021-09-27
  9. NEP-ICT: Information and Communication Technologies (2) 2014-08-16 2014-11-01
  10. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (2) 2021-08-09 2021-09-27
  11. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2013-12-15

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