Report NEP-DES-2019-09-23

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Federico Echenique & Antonio Miralles & Jun Zhang, 2019. "Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium," Papers 1909.05986, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2019. "Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting," Working Papers tecipa-644, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2200, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
• Choo, Lawrence & Kaplan, Todd R. & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2019. "Can auctions select people by their level-k types?," MPRA Paper 95987, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Berliant, Marcus & Thakur, Sounak, 2019. "Commitment and matching in the marriage market," MPRA Paper 96001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Trudeau, Christian & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2018. "Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value," MPRA Paper 95999, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Mihir Bhattacharya & Nicolas Gravel, 2019. "Is the preference of the majority representative?," AMSE Working Papers 1921, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.