Report NEP-DES-2024-04-22

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Sophia Gao issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024. "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_519, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2024. "Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2375R1, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
• Eduardo Perez-Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2024. "Score-based mechanisms," Papers 2403.08031, arXiv.org.
• Yang Cai & Yingkai Li & Jinzhao Wu, 2024. "Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2403.08145, arXiv.org.
• Martino Banchio & Aranyak Mehta & Andres Perlroth, 2024. "Auctions with Dynamic Scoring," Papers 2403.11022, arXiv.org.
• Malachy James Gavan & Antonio Penta, 2024. "Safe Implementation," Working Papers 202401, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
• Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2024. "The Best of Many Robustness Criteria in Decision Making: Formulation and Application to Robust Pricing," Papers 2403.12260, arXiv.org.