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Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Tibor Heumann
  • Stephen Morris
  • Constantine Sorokin
  • Eyal Winter

Abstract

We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second-price auction. The seller faces a trade-off: more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but creates higher information rents for bidders. The information disclosure policy that maximizes the revenue of the seller is to fully reveal low values (where competition is high) but to pool high values (where competition is low). The size of the pool is determined by a critical quantile that is independent of the distribution of values and only dependent on the number of bidders. We discuss how this policy provides a rationale for conflation in digital advertising.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2022. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 371-388, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:4:y:2022:i:3:p:371-88
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210504
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2338, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023. "Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2375, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Yang Cai & Yingkai Li & Jinzhao Wu, 2024. "Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2403.08145, arXiv.org.
    4. Mateusz Mysliwski & Lars Nesheim & Simeon Duckworth, 2023. "Taking the biscuit: how Safari privacy policies affect online advertising," CeMMAP working papers 04/23, Institute for Fiscal Studies.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising

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