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Daniel Fragiadakis

Personal Details

First Name:Daniel
Middle Name:
Last Name:Fragiadakis
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pfr392
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/danielfragiadakis/

Affiliation

(50%) School of Business
Villanova University

Villanova, Pennsylvania (United States)
http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/business.html
RePEc:edi:sbvilus (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Economics Department
School of Business
Villanova University

Villanova, Pennsylvania (United States)
https://www1.villanova.edu/content/university/business/faculty-and-research/academic-departments/economics.html
RePEc:edi:edvilus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Fragiadakis, Daniel & Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Improving matching under hard distributional constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Fragiadakis, Daniel & Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Improving matching under hard distributional constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 993, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 20 Feb 2020.
    2. Yasunori Okumura, 2019. "School Choice with General Constraints: A Market Design Approach for the Nursery School Waiting List Problem in Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 497-516, December.
    3. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2021. "How to De-Reserves Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India," Papers 2103.05899, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    4. Tayfun Sonmez & Utku Unver, 2022. "Informed Neutrality in Minimalist Market Design: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India," Papers 2210.10166, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    5. Taro Kumano & Morimitsu Kurino, 2022. "Quota Adjustment Process," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2022-016, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    6. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 536-548.
    7. Tayfun Sonmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Constitutional Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies in India," Papers 2203.01483, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    8. Zhenhua Jiao & Ziyang Shen & Guoqiang Tian, 2022. "When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 257-282, February.
    9. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 977, Boston College Department of Economics.
    10. Jiao, Zhenhua & Shen, Ziyang, 2021. "School choice with priority-based affirmative action: A responsive solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 1-9.
    11. Isa Hafalir & Fuhito Kojima & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 970, Boston College Department of Economics.
    12. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, "undated". "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
    13. Itai Ashlagi & Amin Saberi & Ali Shameli, 2020. "Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 467-479, March.
    14. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Matsubae, Taisuke & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2018. "The Skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 212-239.
    15. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Designing Direct Matching Mechanism for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action," Papers 2004.13264, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    16. Yuri Faenza & Swati Gupta & Xuan Zhang, 2022. "Discovering Opportunities in New York City's Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive Markets," Papers 2203.00544, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    17. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202104130700001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    18. Liu, Ce, 2018. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Working Papers 2018-13, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    19. Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed, 2020. "Optimizing for Distributional Goals in School Choice Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3657-3676, August.
    20. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1143-1176, May.
    21. Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2018. "Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 81-117.
    22. Kasajima, Yoichi & Toda, Manabu, 2024. "Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 269-286.
    23. Priyanka Shende, 2020. "Constrained Serial Rule on the Full Preference Domain," Papers 2011.01178, arXiv.org.
    24. Jalota, Devansh & Pavone, Marco & Qi, Qi & Ye, Yinyu, 2023. "Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 223-260.
    25. Cho, Sung-Ho & Koshimura, Miyuki & Mandal, Pinaki & Yahiro, Kentaro & Yokoo, Makoto, 2022. "Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    26. Noda, Shunya, 2023. "A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 364-379.
    27. Almeer, Abdullah & Dur, Umut & Harris, Will & Hauser, Greg & Phan, William & Zhang, Yanning, 2024. "Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 34-41.
    28. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2020. "Graduate admission with financial support," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 114-127.
    29. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Affirmative Action with Overlapping Reserves," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 990, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 15 Jan 2020.
    30. Dur, Umut & Zhang, Yanning, 2023. "Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    31. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2022. "How (not) to reform India's affirmative action policies for its economically weaker segments," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1054, Boston College Department of Economics.
    32. Jingsheng Yu & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Efficient and fair trading algorithms in market design environments," Papers 2005.06878, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    33. Tayfun Sonmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2021. "Can Economic Theory Be Informative for the Judiciary? Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Papers 2102.03186, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
    34. Kojima, Fuhito & Tamura, Akihisa & Yokoo, Makoto, 2018. "Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 803-833.
    35. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, 2023. "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/05, Department of Economics, University of York.
    36. Yoichi Kasajima & Manabu Toda, 2021. "Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems," Working Papers 2023-1, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    37. Devansh Jalota & Michael Ostrovsky & Marco Pavone, 2022. "Matching with Transfers under Distributional Constraints," Papers 2202.05232, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    38. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 978, Boston College Department of Economics.
    39. Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2017. "Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 107-142.

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