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Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system

Author

Listed:
  • Almeer, Abdullah
  • Dur, Umut
  • Harris, Will
  • Hauser, Greg
  • Phan, William
  • Zhang, Yanning

Abstract

We study the assignment of an object with multiple copies where various numbers can be reserved for some types of individuals. We focus on the reserve system’s ability to increase the representation of a targeted type. We consider a general setting that covers many features considered in the recent literature; in particular, an individual can belong to more than one type and the priorities of individuals may differ across reserved copies. We show how a precedence order can be modified to increase the representation of the targeted type.

Suggested Citation

  • Almeer, Abdullah & Dur, Umut & Harris, Will & Hauser, Greg & Phan, William & Zhang, Yanning, 2024. "Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 34-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:129:y:2024:i:c:p:34-41
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Market design; Reserves;

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