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Marie-Cecile Fagart

Personal Details

First Name:Marie-Cecile
Middle Name:
Last Name:Fagart
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pfa306
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree: (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

University of Paris Descartes

http://www.parisdescartes.fr/fre/UNIVERSITE
France, Paris

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2014. "Risk Aversion and Incentives," Cahiers de recherche 1405, CIRPEE.
  2. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2012. "The First-Order Approach when the Cost of Effort is Money," Cahiers de recherche 1220, CIRPEE.
  3. Bertrand Crettez & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2008. "Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-14, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  4. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Liability Insurance under the Negligence Rule," Cahiers de recherche 0730, CIRPEE.
  5. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2007. "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration," CEPN Working Papers hal-00143911, HAL.
  6. Bertrand Crettez & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2005. "A Note on The Pareto Efficiency of General Oligopolistic Equilibria," Working Papers 2005-05, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  7. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2004. "Auditing policies and information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 86, Econometric Society.
  8. Charléty-Lepers, Patricia & Fagart, Marie-Cécile & Souam, Saïd, 2004. "Real market concentration through partial acquisitions," ESSEC Working Papers DR 04004, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
  9. M.-C. Fagart & B. Kambia-Chopin, 2002. "Aléa moral et sélection adverse sur le marché de l’assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2002-09, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  10. Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2002. "Wealth Effects, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in a Principal-Agent Model," Working Papers 2002-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  11. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in a Principal-Agent Model," Working Papers 2002-14, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  12. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 02-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  13. Patricia Charlety & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2001. "Prises de participations et expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires," Working Papers 2001-42, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  14. M.-C. Fagart & N. Fombaron & M. Jeleva, 2001. "Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Market," THEMA Working Papers 2001-25, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  15. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 1999. "Optimal Contract with Random Auditing," Working Papers 99-71, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  16. M-C. Fagart & P. Picard, 1998. "Optimal insurance under random auditing," THEMA Working Papers 98-08, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  17. M.- C. Fagart, 1996. "Compagnies d'assurance informées et équilibre sur le marché de l'assurance," THEMA Working Papers 96-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  18. Fagart, M.C., 1995. "Regulating a Private Monoply with Type-Dependent Reservation Profit," Papers 9511, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  19. Cormioer, P. & Fagart, M.C., 1995. "Organisation et risque moral: le role de l'information dans un modele de production jointe," Papers 9512, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  20. Fagart, M.C., 1995. "Concurrence en Contrats, anti-selection et structure d'information," Papers 9503, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  21. Arnaudin-Fagart, M.C., 1992. "Planning a Private Monopoly Under Asymmetric Information," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 92.36, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

Articles

  1. Fagart, Marie-Cécile & Fluet, Claude, 2013. "The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 7-16.
  2. Bertrand Crettez & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2009. "Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(2), pages 97-118, November.
  3. Marie‐Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Liability insurance under the negligence rule," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 486-508, September.
  4. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2009. "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 508-534, September.
  5. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2009. "Information sur les franchissements de seuils. Des conséquences positives sur la valorisation des entreprises," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 60(3), pages 679-691.
  6. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007. "Ranking Contingent Monitoring Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1501-1509, September.
  7. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, 2006. "Prevention in insurance markets," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 82, pages 55-70.
  8. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Nathalie Fombaron & Meglena Jeleva, 2002. "Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 27(2), pages 115-141, December.
  9. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Pierre Picard, 1999. "Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 24(1), pages 29-54, June.
  10. Marie-Cécile Fagart, 1996. "Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 43, pages 1-27.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2012. "The First-Order Approach when the Cost of Effort is Money," Cahiers de recherche 1220, CIRPEE.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Lang, 2021. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9458, CESifo.
    2. Nicolas Quérou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2020. "Contracting Under Unverifiable Monetary Costs," Post-Print hal-02866383, HAL.
    3. Richard Peter, 2021. "Who should exert more effort? Risk aversion, downside risk aversion and optimal prevention," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1259-1281, June.
    4. Jung, Jin Yong & Kim, Son Ku, 2015. "Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 243-279.
    5. Richard Peter, 2024. "The economics of self-protection," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 49(1), pages 6-35, March.
    6. Peter, Richard, 2021. "Prevention as a Giffen good," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    7. Wang, Leran, 2021. "Fertility, Imperfect Labor Market, and Notional Defined Contribution Pension," The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, Elsevier, vol. 20(C).
    8. Fraser, Clive D., 2021. "Protection in numbers? Self-protection as a local public good," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    9. Han Bleichrodt, 2022. "The prevention puzzle," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 47(2), pages 277-297, September.

  2. Bertrand Crettez & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2008. "Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-14, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

    Cited by:

    1. Jacopo Zotti, 2015. "The Long Italian Stagnation and the Welfare Effects of Outsourcing," Working Papers 2015.105, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Marc Deschamps, 2013. "Pourquoi des politiques de concurrence ?," GREDEG Working Papers 2013-23, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    3. Jingang Zhao, 2009. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal number of firms," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(3), pages 235-246, December.
    4. Leonard F. S. Wang & Ji Sun, 2023. "Corporate profit tax, firm entry with unemployment, and income inequality," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 380-392, April.
    5. Illtae Ahn & Hyukseung Shin, 2012. "Domestic Welfare Effects Of The Entry Of A Foreign Firm," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 37(2), pages 35-57, June.
    6. Arijit Mukherjee & Udo Broll & Soma Mukherjee, 2008. "The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market," Discussion Papers 08/12, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.

  3. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Liability Insurance under the Negligence Rule," Cahiers de recherche 0730, CIRPEE.

    Cited by:

    1. Fluet, Claude, 2010. "L’économie de la preuve judiciaire," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 86(4), pages 451-486, décembre.
    2. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    3. BOYER, Marcel & PORRINI, Donatella, 2010. "Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors : An Exploratory Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 05-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    4. Donald J., Wright, 2011. "Medical malpractice and physician liability under a negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 205-211, September.
    5. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2009. "Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data," Working Papers hal-00414479, HAL.
    6. Georges Dionnne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Jean Pinquet, 2012. "A Review of Recent Theoretical and Empirical Analyses of Asymmetric Information in Road Safety and Automobile Insurance," Cahiers de recherche 1204, CIRPEE.
    7. Jean‐Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2020. "Insurance law and incomplete contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1253-1286, December.
    8. Alfred Endres & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Market Power in the Eco-industry: Polluters’ Incentives under Environmental Liability Law," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 88(1), pages 121-138.

  4. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2007. "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration," CEPN Working Papers hal-00143911, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Heiko Karle & Tobias J. Klein & Konrad O. Stahl, 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 3380, CESifo.
    2. Saïd Souam & Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2019. "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power," Post-Print hal-02271905, HAL.
    3. Li, Ran & Yan, Jin-Jiang & Wang, Xian-Yu, 2024. "Horizontal cooperation strategies for competing manufacturers in a capital constrained supply chain," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    4. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2017. "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power," Working Papers hal-04141634, HAL.

  5. Bertrand Crettez & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2005. "A Note on The Pareto Efficiency of General Oligopolistic Equilibria," Working Papers 2005-05, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Colacicco, Rudy, 2012. "Strategic Trade Policy in General Oligopolistic Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 38118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bertrand Crettez & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2008. "Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-14, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    3. Rudy Colacicco, 2015. "Ten Years Of General Oligopolistic Equilibrium: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(5), pages 965-992, December.

  6. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2004. "Auditing policies and information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 86, Econometric Society.

    Cited by:

    1. AMIR, Rabah & CZUPRYNA, Marcin, 2004. "On inverse utility and third-order effects in the economics of uncertainty," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

  7. M.-C. Fagart & B. Kambia-Chopin, 2002. "Aléa moral et sélection adverse sur le marché de l’assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2002-09, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

    Cited by:

    1. Ciprian MatiÅŸ & Eugenia MatiÅŸ, 2013. "Asymmetric Information In Insurance Field: Some General Considerations," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(15), pages 1-17.
    2. Kambia-Chopin, Bidénam, 2003. "Coûts de l’autoprotection et équilibre d’un marché de l’assurance concurrentiel," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 79(3), pages 327-347, Septembre.

  8. Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2002. "Wealth Effects, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in a Principal-Agent Model," Working Papers 2002-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Hector Chade, 2017. "Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," 2017 Meeting Papers 1537, Society for Economic Dynamics.

  9. Patricia Charlety & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2001. "Prises de participations et expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires," Working Papers 2001-42, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2007. "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration," Working Papers hal-00143911, HAL.
    2. Anne Perrot, 2002. "Les frontières entre régulation sectorielle et politique de la concurrence," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(4), pages 81-112.
    3. Charléty-Lepers, Patricia & Fagart, Marie-Cécile & Souam, Saïd, 2004. "Real market concentration through partial acquisitions," ESSEC Working Papers DR 04004, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    4. Patricia Charléty & Said Souam, 2002. "Analyse économique des fusions horizontales," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 17(2), pages 37-68.

  10. M.-C. Fagart & N. Fombaron & M. Jeleva, 2001. "Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Market," THEMA Working Papers 2001-25, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    2. Nathalie Fombaron & Georges Dionne & Wanda Mimra, 2023. "Adverse Sélection in Insurance," Post-Print hal-04416340, HAL.
    3. Bourlès, Renaud, 2007. "On the Emergence of Private Insurance in Presence of Mutual Agreements," MPRA Paper 5821, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. David Alary & Catherine Bobtcheff & Carole Haritchabalet, 2018. "Insurance pools for new and undiversifiable risk," Post-Print hal-02440928, HAL.
    5. Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.

  11. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 1999. "Optimal Contract with Random Auditing," Working Papers 99-71, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Thierry Pénard & S. Souam, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Post-Print halshs-00069687, HAL.

  12. M-C. Fagart & P. Picard, 1998. "Optimal insurance under random auditing," THEMA Working Papers 98-08, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel J. Clarke, 2011. "Reinsuring the Poor: Group Microinsurance Design and Costly State Verification," Economics Series Working Papers 573, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Joerg Schiller, 2003. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Microeconomics 0309003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Oct 2003.
    3. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    4. Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
    5. Thierry Pénard & S. Souam, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Post-Print halshs-00069687, HAL.
    6. Qin Lian & Harris Schlesinger, 2012. "Insurance Contract Design When the Insurer Has Private Information on Loss Size," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(4), pages 1039-1050, December.
    7. Dionne, Georges, 2012. "The empirical measure of information problems with emphasis on insurance fraud and dynamic data," Working Papers 12-10, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    8. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Pierre Picard, 1998. "Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing," Working Papers 98-47, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    9. Kai Sülzle & Achim Wambach, 2002. "Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 677, CESifo.
    10. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2011. "Granting An Exit Option To Conduct An Audit," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 438-463, October.
    11. Guillaume Carlier & Rose-Anne Dana, 2003. "Pareto efficient insurance contracts when the insurer's cost function is discontinuous," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(4), pages 871-893, June.
    12. Hau, Arthur, 2008. "Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1680-1700, May.
    13. Zheng, Jiakun, 2020. "Optimal insurance design under narrow framing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 596-607.
    14. Nell, Martin & Schiller, Jörg, 2002. "Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten von Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 7, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    15. P. Picard, 1998. "Insurance fraud : theory," THEMA Working Papers 98-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    16. Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    17. Richard Watt, 2003. "Curtailing Ex-Post Fraud in Risk Sharing Arrangements," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 247-263, September.

  13. M.- C. Fagart, 1996. "Compagnies d'assurance informées et équilibre sur le marché de l'assurance," THEMA Working Papers 96-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: a Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    2. Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2005. "Competition between insurers with superior information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 321-340, February.

  14. Fagart, M.C., 1995. "Concurrence en Contrats, anti-selection et structure d'information," Papers 9503, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..

    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: a Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    2. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2014. "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," TSE Working Papers 14-532, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2016.
    3. Anqi Li & Yiqing Xing, 2018. "Intermediated Implementation," Papers 1810.11475, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
    4. Thomas Mariotti, 2016. "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," 2016 Meeting Papers 820, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2002. "Asymmetric Information in Insurance : General Testable Implications," Working Papers 2002-42, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    6. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.
    7. Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.

Articles

  1. Fagart, Marie-Cécile & Fluet, Claude, 2013. "The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 7-16.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Bertrand Crettez & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2009. "Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(2), pages 97-118, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Marie‐Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Liability insurance under the negligence rule," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 486-508, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2009. "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 508-534, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007. "Ranking Contingent Monitoring Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1501-1509, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A. & Lohse, Tim & Qari, Salmai, 2014. "Deception choice and self-selection – The importance of being earnest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 25-39.
    2. Peter-J. Jost, 2023. "Auditing versus monitoring and the role of commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 463-496, June.
    3. Jung, Jin Yong & Kim, Son Ku, 2015. "Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 243-279.
    4. Keenan, Donald C. & Snow, Arthur, 2022. "Reversibly greater downside risk aversion by a prudence-based measure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    5. M. Denuit & L. Eeckhoudt & Béatrice Rey, 2010. "Some consequences of correlation aversion in decision science," Post-Print halshs-00485722, HAL.
    6. Au, Pak Hung & Chen, Bin R., 2019. "Objective and subjective indicators in long-term contracting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 309-331.
    7. Sebastian Ebert & Daniel Wiesen, 2011. "Testing for Prudence and Skewness Seeking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(7), pages 1334-1349, July.
    8. Marie‐Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Liability insurance under the negligence rule," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 486-508, September.
    9. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Post-Print halshs-02292785, HAL.
    10. Keenan, Donald C. & Snow, Arthur, 2010. "Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 2018-2026, September.
    11. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Sandrine Spaeter, 2018. "Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing," Post-Print halshs-02292797, HAL.
    12. Alonso-Paulí, Eduard & André, Francisco J., 2015. "Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 85-106.
    13. Denuit, Michel & Rey, Béatrice, 2010. "Prudence, temperance, edginess, and risk apportionment as decreasing sensitivity to detrimental changes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 137-143, September.
    14. Lohse, Tim & Konrad, Kai A. & Qari, Salmai, 2014. "Deception Choice and Audit Design - The Importance of Being Earnest," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100577, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  6. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, 2006. "Prevention in insurance markets," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 82, pages 55-70.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel L. McFadden & Carlos E. Noton & Pau Olivella, 2012. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," NBER Working Papers 17938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Vickie Bajtelsmit & Paul D. Thistle, 2008. "The Reasonable Person Negligence Standard and Liability Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 815-823, December.
    3. Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon, 2006. "Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 847-860, September.

  7. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Nathalie Fombaron & Meglena Jeleva, 2002. "Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 27(2), pages 115-141, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Pierre Picard, 1999. "Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 24(1), pages 29-54, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Marie-Cécile Fagart, 1996. "Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 43, pages 1-27.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2004-07-04 2008-05-17 2012-04-23 2014-02-02
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2004-07-04 2008-05-17
  3. NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (2) 2001-10-22 2007-10-13
  4. NEP-ACC: Accounting and Auditing (1) 2004-12-02
  5. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2008-05-17
  6. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2002-12-02
  7. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2012-04-23
  8. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2007-10-13
  9. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2012-04-23
  10. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2014-02-02

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