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Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data

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  • Jean Pinquet

    (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Georges Dionne

    (HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal)

  • Charles Vanasse

    (HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal)

  • Maurice Mathieu

    (HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal)

Abstract

Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote safe driving. Examples of mechanisms are fines, experience rating and point-record driving licenses. We analyse the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit points. These properties are tested empirically with data from the Quebec public insurance plan. We find evidence of moral hazard, which means that drivers who accumulate demerit points become more careful because they are at threat of losing their license. The insurance rating scheme introduced in 1992 reduced the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. We use this result to derive monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Maurice Mathieu, 2011. "Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data," Post-Print hal-00567866, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00567866
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00567866
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    References listed on IDEAS

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