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Gorkem Celik

Personal Details

First Name:Gorkem
Middle Name:
Last Name:Celik
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pce23
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite/
Terminal Degree:2002 Department of Economics; Northwestern University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(50%) ESSEC Business School

Cergy-Pontoise, France
http://www.essec.fr/
RePEc:edi:essecfr (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Théorie Économique, Modélisation, Application (THEMA)
Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Cergy-Pontoise, France
https://thema.u-cergy.fr/
RePEc:edi:themafr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Gorkem Celik & Roland Strausz, 2024. "Selling Certification of Private and Market Information," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0045, Berlin School of Economics.
  2. Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2020. "Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 251, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  3. Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2018. "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 105, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  4. Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya, 2015. "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1501, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  5. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.
  6. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2008. "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2008-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  7. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2005. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-05-09-03-55-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 09 Jun 2006.
  8. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  9. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-09-13-05-50-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  10. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 27 Jan 2008.
  11. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.

Articles

  1. Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 256-290, March.
  2. Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2021. "Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 314-333, June.
  3. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017. "Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 148-174.
  4. Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
  5. Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
  6. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 375-387.
  7. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
  8. Celik Gorkem & Yilankaya Okan, 2009. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-33, July.
  9. Celik Gorkem, 2008. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-45, February.
  10. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September.
  11. Celik, Gorkem, 2006. "Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 37-44, July.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2020. "Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 251, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

    Cited by:

    1. Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 256-290, March.

  2. Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2018. "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 105, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

    Cited by:

    1. Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 47, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

  3. Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya, 2015. "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1501, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.

    Cited by:

    1. Akyol, Ethem, 2019. "Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 6-19.
    2. Akyol, Ethem, 2021. "Can resale harm the original seller in a second-price auction?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).

  4. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.

    Cited by:

    1. Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst, 2018. "Sender-receiver games with cooperation," Post-Print hal-02313962, HAL.
    2. Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2016. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Post-Print hal-02276751, HAL.
    3. Frédéric Koessler & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2010. "Committing to transparency to resist corruption," Working Papers halshs-00564890, HAL.
    4. Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
    5. Galperti, Simone, 2015. "Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 648-667.
    6. Balzer, Benjamin & Schneider, Johannes, 2023. "Mechanism design with informational punishment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 197-209.

  5. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2008. "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2008-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.

    Cited by:

    1. Bouët, Antoine & Laborde Debucquet, David & Martimort, David, 2014. "Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements:," IFPRI discussion papers 1383, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    2. B. Julien & Jérôme Pouyet & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2017. "An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Early Contracting with Endogenous Threat," Post-Print hal-02980365, HAL.
    3. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 135-166.
    4. Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst, 2018. "Sender-receiver games with cooperation," Post-Print hal-02313962, HAL.
    5. Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2016. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Post-Print hal-02276751, HAL.
    6. Madhav S. Aney, 2012. "Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach," Working Papers 18-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    7. Jin Yeub Kim, 2020. "Efficient and Neutral Mechanisms in Almost Ex Ante Bargaining Problems," Working papers 2020rwp-174, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    8. Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
    9. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
    10. Balzer, Benjamin & Schneider, Johannes, 2021. "Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    11. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.
    12. Jin Yeub Kim, 2019. "Neutral Public Good Mechanisms," Working papers 2019rwp-159, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    13. Benjamin Balzer & Johannes Schneider, 2022. "Mechanism Design with Informational Punishment," Papers 2201.01149, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    14. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
    15. Jin Yeub Kim, 2020. "A Noncooperative Foundation of the Neutral Bargaining Solution," Working papers 2020rwp-175, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    16. Kim, Jin Yeub, 2017. "Interim third-party selection in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 645-665.
    17. Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2020. "Consulting collusive experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 290-317.
    18. Schneider, Johannes & Balzer, Benjamin, 2016. "Managing a Conflict," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145686, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Balzer, Benjamin & Schneider, Johannes, 2023. "Mechanism design with informational punishment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 197-209.

  6. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2005. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-05-09-03-55-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 09 Jun 2006.

    Cited by:

    1. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Nicole Immorlica & Yingkai Li & Brendan Lucier, 2021. "Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation," Papers 2103.03980, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    2. Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Hanke, Ann-Katrin & Ott, Marion, 2020. "A small volume reduction that melts down the market: Auctions with endogenous rationing," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-014, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Hu Luke, 2013. "Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 179-189, May.
    4. Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya, 2015. "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1501, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    5. Benny Moldovanu & Alex Gershkov & Philipp Strack, 2018. "A Theory of Auctions With Endogenous Valuations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_031, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    6. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2011. "On favoritism in auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 265-267, March.
    7. Bognar, Katalin & Börgers, Tilman & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz, 2010. "An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly," MPRA Paper 29123, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Shanglyu Deng & Qiyao Zhou, 2023. "Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence," Papers 2306.17355, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    11. Hubbard, Timothy P. & Paarsch, Harry J., 2009. "Investigating bid preferences at low-price, sealed-bid auctions with endogenous participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-14, January.
    12. Grüner, Hans Peter & Tröger, Thomas, 2018. "Linear voting rules," Working Papers 18-01, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    13. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 94605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Xiaoyong Cao & Guofu Tan & Guoqiang Tian & Okan Yilankaya, 2018. "Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 231-249, March.
    15. Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2019. "Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1200, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    16. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2005. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-05-09-03-55-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 09 Jun 2006.
    17. René Kirkegaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2008. "Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 770-789, September.
    18. Yumiko Baba, 2013. "A Note On Dutch Auctions With Time Credits," Working Papers e053, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    19. Bognar, Katalin & Börgers, Tilman & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz, 2015. "An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 1056-1073.

  7. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.

    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

  8. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-09-13-05-50-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.

    Cited by:

    1. Alistair Munro, 2014. "Hide and Seek: A Theory of Efficient Income Hiding within the Household," GRIPS Discussion Papers 14-17, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    2. Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2024. "Unidirectional Incentive Compatibility," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_524, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    4. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
    5. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2022. "Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 348, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    6. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2020. "Project selection with partially verifiable information," Papers 2007.00907, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.

  9. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.

    Cited by:

    1. Tröger, Thomas & Mylovanov, Timofiy, 2012. "Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case," Working Papers 12-14, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    2. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 27 Jan 2008.
    3. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2016. "Collusion Constrained Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001288, David K. Levine.
    4. Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio & Jorge Ponce, 2018. "Flexible and mandatory banking supervision," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/266998, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," IDEI Working Papers 167, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    6. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2014. "Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000982, David K. Levine.
    7. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty corruption and citizen feedback," Working Papers 2015/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    8. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Discussion Papers 2020/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    9. Pushkar Maitra & Sandip Mitra & Dilip Mookherjee & Alberto Motta & Sujata Visaria, 2014. "Financing Smallholder Agriculture: An Experiment with Agent-Intermediated Microloans in India," Monash Economics Working Papers 35-14, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    10. Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
    11. Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree, 2013. "Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats," Working Papers UWEC-2013-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    12. Keeyoung Rhee, 2021. "Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard and Costly Lying," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 37, pages 115-140.
    13. Muhammad Irdam Ferdiansah & Vincent K. Chong & Isabel Z. Wang & David R. Woodliff, 2023. "The Effect of Ethical Commitment Reminder and Reciprocity in the Workplace on Misreporting," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 186(2), pages 325-345, August.
    14. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
    15. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    16. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    17. Phalippou, Ludovic & Rauch, Christian & Umber, Marc, 2018. "Private equity portfolio company fees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 559-585.
    18. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Preemptive Bribery with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 13/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    19. Theilen, Bernd, 1965-, 2011. "Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting," Working Papers 2072/169684, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    20. Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
    21. Asseyer, Andreas, 2016. "Optimal Information Disclosure and Collusion," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145779, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    22. Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2020. "Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: A real options approach," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 273-287.
    23. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2009. "Contracting with Third Parties," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 75-100, February.
    24. Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & José García-Montalvo, 2016. "The Microeconomics of Corruption. A Review of Thirty Years of Research," Working Papers 908, Barcelona School of Economics.
    25. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015. "Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
    26. Roberto Burguet, 2017. "Procurement Design with Corruption," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 315-341, May.
    27. Leonardo Felli, 1996. "Preventing Collusion Through Discretion," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1996/303, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    28. Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023. "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    29. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2007. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," MPRA Paper 6098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    30. Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2020. "Consulting collusive experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 290-317.
    31. D'Hulster, Katia, 2011. "Cross border banking supervision : incentive conflicts in supervisory information sharing between home and host supervisors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5871, The World Bank.
    32. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    33. Angelucci, Charles & Russo, Antonio, 2012. "Moral Hazard in Hierarchies and Soft Information," TSE Working Papers 12-343, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    34. Leonardo Felli & Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2015. "Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing," CESifo Working Paper Series 5343, CESifo.
    35. Bilgehan Karabay, 2017. "Optimal Regulation of Multinationals under Collusion," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(8), pages 1687-1706, August.
    36. Bernd Theilen, 2012. "Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 561-590, October.
    37. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty Corruption and Citizen Reports," CESifo Working Paper Series 5528, CESifo.

Articles

  1. Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 256-290, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2021. "Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 314-333, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017. "Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 148-174.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.
    2. Alexey Kushnir & Shuo Liu, 2019. "On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 617-644, April.
    3. Dilip Mookherjee & Masatoshi Tsumagari, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Communication Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(5), pages 1094-1129.
    4. Navin Kartik & SangMok Lee & Daniel Rappoport, 2022. "Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments," Papers 2212.12009, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.

  6. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 375-387.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Celik Gorkem & Yilankaya Okan, 2009. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-33, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Celik Gorkem, 2008. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-45, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
    3. Bilgehan Karabay, 2017. "Optimal Regulation of Multinationals under Collusion," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(8), pages 1687-1706, August.

  10. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Goel, Rajeev K. & Mazhar, Ummad & Sayan, Serdar, 2021. "Strategic location of firms: Does it empower bribe givers or bribe takers?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 45(3).

  11. Celik, Gorkem, 2006. "Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 37-44, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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Featured entries

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki entries:
  1. Turkish Economists

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 10 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (8) 2004-06-02 2011-08-09 2015-01-26 2017-06-11 2018-07-16 2021-05-03 2023-01-23 2024-09-02. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (5) 2008-08-21 2011-08-09 2015-01-26 2017-06-11 2023-01-23. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (4) 2008-08-21 2011-08-09 2015-01-26 2024-09-02
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2015-01-26 2017-06-11 2024-09-02
  5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2021-05-03 2024-09-02
  6. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2011-08-09
  7. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2008-08-21
  8. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2018-07-16
  9. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2023-01-23
  10. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2005-08-13
  11. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (1) 2018-07-16
  12. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2005-08-13

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