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Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands

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  • René Kirkegaard
  • Per Baltzer Overgaard

Abstract

Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy‐out price. In one‐shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy‐out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy‐out price causes the auction sequence to become inefficient, because the first item may be awarded to a bidder who should have received none.

Suggested Citation

  • René Kirkegaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2008. "Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 770-789, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:3:p:770-789
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00038.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, "undated". "Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand," Economics Working Papers 2003-4, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
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    4. repec:bla:jindec:v:48:y:2000:i:3:p:227-52 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Timothy Mathews, 2004. "The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Buyout Option: a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay’s Buy-It-Now Feature," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 25-52, January.
    6. Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 2008. "Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 145-165, May.
    7. Celik Gorkem & Yilankaya Okan, 2009. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-33, July.
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    9. Timothy Mathews & Brett Katzman, 2006. "The role of varying risk attitudes in an auction with a buyout option," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 597-613, April.
    10. Kirkegaard, Rene, 2005. "Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 328-332, December.
    11. Katzman, Brett, 1999. "A Two Stage Sequential Auction with Multi-Unit Demands," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 77-99, May.
    12. Timothy Mathews, 2003. "A Risk Averse Seller in a Continuous Time Auction with a Buyout Option," Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, vol. 5(2), January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 1284-1320.
    2. Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Brennan C. Platt, 2020. "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(12), pages 3748-3785, December.
    3. Anwar, Sajid & Zheng, Mingli, 2015. "Posted price selling and online auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 81-92.
    4. Nicholas Shunda, 2009. "Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough)," Alumni working papers 2009-02, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    5. Shunda, Nicholas, 2009. "Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 645-664, November.
    6. Jong-Rong Chen & Kong-Pin Chen & Chien-Fu Chou & Ching-I Huang, 2013. "A Dynamic Model of Auctions with Buy-It-Now: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 393-429, June.
    7. Chen, Kong-Pin & Lai, Hung-pin & Yu, Ya-Ting, 2018. "The seller's listing strategy in online auctions: Evidence from eBay," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 107-144.
    8. Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 2008. "Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 145-165, May.
    9. Maxime C. Cohen & Antoine Désir & Nitish Korula & Balasubramanian Sivan, 2023. "Best of Both Worlds Ad Contracts: Guaranteed Allocation and Price with Programmatic Efficiency," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(7), pages 4027-4050, July.
    10. Peyman Khezr, 2018. "Why Sellers Avoid Auctions: Theory and Evidence," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 163-182, February.
    11. Xin Wang & Alan Montgomery & Kannan Srinivasan, 2008. "When auction meets fixed price: a theoretical and empirical examination of buy-it-now auctions," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 339-370, December.
    12. Bauner, Christoph, 2015. "Mechanism choice and the buy-it-now auction: A structural model of competing buyers and sellers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 19-31.
    13. Olarte, Rafael & Haghani, Ali, 2018. "Introducing and testing a game-theoretic model for a lottery-based metering system in Minneapolis, United States," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 63-78.

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