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Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard and Costly Lying

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  • Keeyoung Rhee

    (Korea Development Institute)

Abstract

We present a model in which the agent reports a privately observed signal about the stochastic outcome of her action, while bearing a cost of misreporting her private information. If the agent receives a low payment contingent on her performance, it is very costly for the agent to misreport her information to the principal so that the principal makes a decision favorable to the agent. However, if the contingent compensation is too high, the principal will terminate the project unless the agent truthfully reports that the project is likely to give a high return. The optimal outcome is achieved by a contract with the fee structure loosely tied with the outcome, but the cost of lying is necessarily high.

Suggested Citation

  • Keeyoung Rhee, 2021. "Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard and Costly Lying," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 37, pages 115-140.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20210101-37-1-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contract theory; moral hazard; strategic communication; lying costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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