Christian At

Personal Details

First Name:	Christian
Middle Name:
Last Name:	At
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pat101
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	http://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/christian_at.html

Affiliation

Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Économiques (CRESE)
UFR des Sciences Juridiques, Économiques, Politiques et de Gestion
Université de Franche-Comté

Besançon, France
http://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/
RePEc:edi:crufcfr (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2018. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Working Papers of BETA 2018-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
   • At Christian & Friehe Tim & Gabuthy Yannick, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-11, April.
   • Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Post-Print hal-02309475, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2020. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," CEPR Discussion Papers 15567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," MPRA Paper 106427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
   3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," MPRA Paper 97912, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
      • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 13841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

2. Lionel Thomas & Christian At, 2018. "Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Post-Print hal-03763708, HAL.
   • Christian At & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 101(3), pages 941-959.

   Cited by:

   1. Qinan Lu & Xiaodong Du & Huanguang Qiu, 2022. "Adoption patterns and productivity impacts of agricultural mechanization services," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 53(5), pages 826-845, September.

3. Christian At & Lionel Thomas, 2016. "Optimal lending contracts," Post-Print hal-03790381, HAL.
   • Christian At & Lionel Thomas, 2017. "Optimal lending contracts," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 263-277.

   Cited by:

   1. Taneli M�kinen & Lucio Sarno & Gabriele Zinna, 2019. "Risky bank guarantees," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1232, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
      • Mäkinen, Taneli & Sarno, Lucio & Zinna, Gabriele, 2020. "Risky bank guarantees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(2), pages 490-522.
      • Sarno, Lucio & Mäkinen, Taneli & Zinna, Gabriele, 2019. "Risky Bank Guarantees," CEPR Discussion Papers 13709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   2. Lionel Thomas & Yolande Hiriart, 2015. "The Optimal Regulation of a Risky Monopoly," Working Papers hal-01377921, HAL.
      • Yolande Hiriart & Lionel Thomas, 2015. "The Optimal Regulation of a Risky Monopoly," Working Papers 2015-16, CRESE.
      • Hiriart, Yolande & Thomas, Lionel, 2017. "The optimal regulation of a risky monopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 111-136.

4. Christian At, 2015. "Shareholder vs. Stakeholder Protection and Interest Group Politics," Post-Print halshs-01308188, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Christian At, 2017. "The Market for Corporate Control with Influential- and Dependent-Stakeholder Protection," Post-Print hal-03764237, HAL.
      • Christian At, 2017. "The Market for Corporate Control with Influential- and Dependent-Stakeholder Protection," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(3), pages 419-430, September.

5. Christian At & Yannick Gabuthy, 2015. "Moral Hazard and Agency Relationship in Sequential Litigation," Post-Print halshs-01309094, HAL.
   • At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015. "Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.

   Cited by:

   1. At Christian & Friehe Tim & Gabuthy Yannick, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-11, April.
      • Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Post-Print hal-02309475, HAL.
      • Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2018. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Working Papers of BETA 2018-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
   2. Wang, Cheng, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5248, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
      • Cheng Wang, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 396-422, July.
   3. Yannick Gabuthy & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2019. "Lawyer Fee Arrangements and Litigation Outcomes : An Auction-Theoretic Perspective," Working Papers hal-01973660, HAL.
      • Yannick Gabuthy & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2019. "Lawyer Fee Arrangements and Litigation Outcomes: An Auction-Theoretic Perspective," Working Papers of BETA 2019-03, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

6. Christian At & Sylvain Béal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2013. "Freezeout, Compensation Rules and Voting Equilibria," Working Papers 2013-04, CRESE.
   • At, Christian & Béal, Sylvain & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2015. "Freezeout, compensation rules, and voting equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 91-102.
   • Christian At & Sylvain Béal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2015. "Freezeout, Compensation Rules, and Voting Equilibria," Post-Print halshs-01308314, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Mani, Sureshbabu & Ye, Pengfei, 2016. "Relative peer quality and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 196-219.
   2. World Bank, 2017. "Brazil’s INDC Restoration and Reforestation Target," World Bank Publications - Reports 28588, The World Bank Group.

7. Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2009. "Privatization and Leverage," Post-Print hal-01313413, HAL.
   • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2012. "Privatization and Leverage," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 32-44.

   Cited by:

   1. Ifzal Ahmad, 2017. "Understanding Internal, External and Relational Attributions in Reaction to Corporate Social Responsibility," Business & Economic Review, Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan, vol. 9(4), pages 49-64, December.
   2. Hökelekli, Gizem & Lamey, Lien & Verboven, Frank, 2017. "Private label line proliferation and private label tier pricing: A new dimension of competition between private labels and national brands," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 39-52.
   3. Andrew, Jane & Cahill, Damien, 2017. "Rationalising and resisting neoliberalism: The uneven geography of costs," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 12-28.

8. Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2008. "Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests," Post-Print hal-00448000, HAL.
   • At, Christian & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2008. "Jump bidding in ascending auctions: The case of takeover contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 458-460, June.

   Cited by:

   1. Dodonova, Anna, 2017. "Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 214-216.
   2. Dodonova, Anna & Khoroshilov, Yuri, 2014. "Can preemptive bidding in takeover auctions be socially optimal? Yes it can," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 34-47.
   3. Dodonova, Anna, 2013. "Preemptive bidding in takeover auctions with externality," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 35-44.
   4. Anna Dodonova & Yuri Khoroshilov, 2021. "Private Value Takeover Auctions with Toeholds: An Experimental Study," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-10, May.
   5. Dodonova, Anna & Khoroshilov, Yuri, 2020. "Preemptive bidding in common value takeover auctions: Social surplus and the target’s revenue," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).

9. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2008. "Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction," Post-Print hal-00447999, HAL.
   • At Christian & Chappe Nathalie, 2008. "Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 35-44, February.

   Cited by:

   1. Simundza Daniel, 2016. "When Should Governments Reveal Criminal Histories?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 311-331, July.
   2. Pasquale L. Scandizzo & Marco Ventura, 2015. "Organized crime, extortion and entrepreneurship under uncertainty," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 119-144, February.
   3. Echazu, Luciana & Nocetti, Diego, 2019. "Understanding risky behaviors during adolescence: A model of self-discovery through experimentation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 12-21.
   4. Mungan, Murat C., 2010. "Repeat offenders: If they learn, we punish them more severely," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 173-177, June.
   5. Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?," Working Papers hal-04140884, HAL.
      • Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?," MPRA Paper 14369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Eric LANGLAIS, 2009. "Deterrence Of A Criminal Team: How To Rely On Its Members' Short Comings ?," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 4(1(7)_ Spr).
      • Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-11, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
      • Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings?," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0902, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2009.
   6. Alfred Endres & Bianca Rundshagen, 2012. "Escalating penalties: a supergame approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 29-49, March.
   7. Wolfgang Eggert & Steffen Minter & Maximilian Stephan & Handirk Ungern-Sternberg, 2017. "Sanctions for repeat offenders: a question of wealth?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(5), pages 467-482, November.

10. Burkart, Mike & At, Christian & Lee, Samuel, 2007. "Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening," CEPR Discussion Papers 6241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • At, Christian & Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2011. "Security-voting structure and bidder screening," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 458-476, July.
    • At, Christian & Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2007. "Security-voting structure and bidder screening," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24473, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • At, Christian & Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2011. "Security-voting structure and bidder screening," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69542, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Samuel Lee & Christian At & Mike Burkart, 2007. "Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening," FMG Discussion Papers dp575, Financial Markets Group.
    • Christian At & Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2011. "Security Voting Structure and Bidder Screening," Post-Print halshs-01308325, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Sergey Stepanov, 2012. "Takeovers under Asymmetric Information: Block Trades and Tender Offers in Equilibrium," Working Papers w0185, New Economic School (NES).
       • Sergey Stepanov, 2012. "Takeovers under Asymmetric Information: Block Trades and Tender Offers in Equilibrium," Working Papers w0185, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    2. Bo Becker & Jens Josephson, 2013. "Insolvency Resolution and the Missing High Yield Bond Markets," NBER Working Papers 19415, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
       • Bo Becker & Jens Josephson, 2016. "Insolvency Resolution and the Missing High-Yield Bond Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(10), pages 2814-2849.
    3. Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2010. "Signaling in Tender Offer Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 7938, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2010. "Signaling in Tender Offer Games," FMG Discussion Papers dp655, Financial Markets Group.
       • Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2010. "Signalling in tender offer games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119085, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2008. "Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests," Post-Print hal-00448000, HAL.
       • At, Christian & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2008. "Jump bidding in ascending auctions: The case of takeover contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 458-460, June.
    5. Christian At, 2017. "The Market for Corporate Control with Influential- and Dependent-Stakeholder Protection," Post-Print hal-03764237, HAL.
       • Christian At, 2017. "The Market for Corporate Control with Influential- and Dependent-Stakeholder Protection," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(3), pages 419-430, September.
    6. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
       • Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2008. "One share - one vote: the theory," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69545, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
       • Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2007. "One Share - One Vote: The Theory," SIFR Research Report Series 57, Institute for Financial Research.
    7. Robert Marquez & Bilge Yılmaz, 2012. "Takeover Bidding and Shareholder Information," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27.
    8. Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2015. "Signalling to dispersed shareholders and corporate control," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69538, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
       • Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2015. "Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(3), pages 922-962.
    9. Levit, Doron, 2017. "Advising shareholders in takeovers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(3), pages 614-634.

11. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe & Lionel Thomas & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2006. "Rémunération optimale des dirigeants : faut-il interdire les bénéfices privés ?," Post-Print hal-00448791, HAL.
    • Christian At & Nathalie Chappe & Pierre-Henri Morand & Lionel Thomas, 2006. "Rémunération optimale des dirigeants : faut-il interdire les bénéfices privés ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 116(6), pages 831-846.

    Cited by:

    1. de La Bruslerie, Hubert & Gueguen, Simon, 2021. "Creditors’ holdup, releveraging and the setting of private appropriation in a control contract between shareholders," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    2. de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2016. "Does debt curb controlling shareholders' private benefits? Modelling in a contingent claim framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 263-282.
       • Hubert de La Bruslerie, 2016. "Does debt curb controlling shareholder's private benfits? Modelling in a contingent claim framework," Post-Print hal-01945646, HAL.

12. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2004. "Sentencing private benefits in a takeover contest," Post-Print halshs-01309085, HAL.
    • At, Christian & Chappe, Nathalie & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2004. "Sentencing private benefits in takeover contest," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 409-424, December.

    Cited by:

    1. de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2013. "Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 88-107.
       • Hubert de La Bruslerie, 2013. "Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?," Post-Print halshs-00937543, HAL.

13. Christian At & Laurent Flochel & Patrick Roger, 2002. "Market-making, inventories and martingale pricing," Post-Print halshs-00178162, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Bams, Dennis & Blanchard, Gildas & Honarvar, Iman & Lehnert, Thorsten, 2017. "Does oil and gold price uncertainty matter for the stock market?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 270-285.

14. Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2001. "The Sales of Small firms : a multidimensional analysis," Post-Print halshs-00179998, HAL.
    • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(4), pages 927-933, November.
    • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "The sales of small firms : a multidimensional analysis," Post-Print halshs-01309043, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Heather Fulford & Alex Rizzo, 2009. "A Conceptual Model For The Strategic Orientation Of Small Firms," Journal of Enterprising Culture (JEC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 17(01), pages 25-54.
    2. Grundström, Christina & Öberg, Christina & Öhrwall Rönnbäck, Anna, 2012. "Family-owned manufacturing SMEs and innovativeness: A comparison between within-family successions and external takeovers," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 162-173.

15. Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2000. "The Choice of voting structure for privatizing a Company," Post-Print halshs-01309050, HAL.
    • At, Christian & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2000. "The choice of the voting structure for privatizing a company," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 287-292, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Ehrhardt, Olaf & Lahr, Henry, 2008. "Uncertain private benefits and the decision to go public," CEFS Working Paper Series 2008-02, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
    2. Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(4), pages 927-933, November.
       • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "The sales of small firms : a multidimensional analysis," Post-Print halshs-01309043, HAL.
       • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2001. "The Sales of Small firms : a multidimensional analysis," Post-Print halshs-00179998, HAL.

Articles

1. At Christian & Friehe Tim & Gabuthy Yannick, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-11, April.
   • Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Post-Print hal-02309475, HAL.
   • Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2018. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Working Papers of BETA 2018-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
   See citations under working paper version above.
2. Christian At & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 101(3), pages 941-959.
   • Lionel Thomas & Christian At, 2018. "Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Post-Print hal-03763708, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
3. Christian At & Lionel Thomas, 2017. "Optimal lending contracts," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 263-277.
   • Christian At & Lionel Thomas, 2016. "Optimal lending contracts," Post-Print hal-03790381, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
4. At, Christian & Béal, Sylvain & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2015. "Freezeout, compensation rules, and voting equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 91-102.
   • Christian At & Sylvain Béal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2013. "Freezeout, Compensation Rules and Voting Equilibria," Working Papers 2013-04, CRESE.
   • Christian At & Sylvain Béal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2015. "Freezeout, Compensation Rules, and Voting Equilibria," Post-Print halshs-01308314, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
5. At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015. "Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
   • Christian At & Yannick Gabuthy, 2015. "Moral Hazard and Agency Relationship in Sequential Litigation," Post-Print halshs-01309094, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
6. Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2012. "Privatization and Leverage," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 32-44.
   • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2009. "Privatization and Leverage," Post-Print hal-01313413, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
7. At, Christian & Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2011. "Security-voting structure and bidder screening," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 458-476, July.
   • At, Christian & Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2007. "Security-voting structure and bidder screening," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24473, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   • Burkart, Mike & At, Christian & Lee, Samuel, 2007. "Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening," CEPR Discussion Papers 6241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • At, Christian & Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2011. "Security-voting structure and bidder screening," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69542, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   • Samuel Lee & Christian At & Mike Burkart, 2007. "Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening," FMG Discussion Papers dp575, Financial Markets Group.
   • Christian At & Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2011. "Security Voting Structure and Bidder Screening," Post-Print halshs-01308325, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
8. At Christian & Chappe Nathalie, 2008. "Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 35-44, February.
   • Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2008. "Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction," Post-Print hal-00447999, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
9. At, Christian & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2008. "Jump bidding in ascending auctions: The case of takeover contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 458-460, June.
   • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2008. "Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests," Post-Print hal-00448000, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
10. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe & Pierre-Henri Morand & Lionel Thomas, 2006. "Rémunération optimale des dirigeants : faut-il interdire les bénéfices privés ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 116(6), pages 831-846.
    • Christian At & Nathalie Chappe & Lionel Thomas & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2006. "Rémunération optimale des dirigeants : faut-il interdire les bénéfices privés ?," Post-Print hal-00448791, HAL.
    See citations under working paper version above.
11. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2005. "Crime timing," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7.

    Cited by:

    1. Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?," Working Papers hal-04140884, HAL.
       • Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?," MPRA Paper 14369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • Eric LANGLAIS, 2009. "Deterrence Of A Criminal Team: How To Rely On Its Members' Short Comings ?," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 4(1(7)_ Spr).
       • Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-11, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
       • Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings?," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0902, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2009.

12. At, Christian & Chappe, Nathalie & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2004. "Sentencing private benefits in takeover contest," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 409-424, December.
    • Christian At & Nathalie Chappe & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2004. "Sentencing private benefits in a takeover contest," Post-Print halshs-01309085, HAL.
    See citations under working paper version above.
13. Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(4), pages 927-933, November.
    • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "The sales of small firms : a multidimensional analysis," Post-Print halshs-01309043, HAL.
    • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2001. "The Sales of Small firms : a multidimensional analysis," Post-Print halshs-00179998, HAL.
    See citations under working paper version above.
14. At, Christian & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2000. "The choice of the voting structure for privatizing a company," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 287-292, September.
    • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2000. "The Choice of voting structure for privatizing a Company," Post-Print halshs-01309050, HAL.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 2007-02-10 2007-03-31 2013-05-24
2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2013-05-24 2018-04-30
3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2018-04-30
4. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2013-05-24
5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2013-05-24
6. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2018-04-30
7. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2013-05-24

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