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La répression des pratiques délictueuses des dirigeants : le rôle des actionnaires

Author

Listed:
  • Christian At

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Nathalie Chappe

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

La criminalité économique et financière est en constante augmentation. Nous nous intéressons ici à l'impact du gouvernement d'entreprise dans la mise en place d'une action judiciaire et au problème de la pénalisation de la vie économique. Nous mettons en avant le rôle déterminant des actionnaires en matière de contrôle des comportements frauduleux des dirigeants, notamment à travers leur rôle de déclencheur de l'action civile. En outre, nous apportons un élément de réponse favorable à la dépénalisation de la vie économique en montrant que l'exercice de l'action publique n'a pas d'effets parfaitement déterminés en matière de dissuasion des comportements abusifs des dirigeants.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2004. "La répression des pratiques délictueuses des dirigeants : le rôle des actionnaires," Post-Print halshs-01309053, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01309053
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    References listed on IDEAS

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