IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ajagec/v101y2019i3p941-959..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Author

Listed:
  • Christian At
  • Lionel Thomas

Abstract

This paper determines the optimal tenurial contract between a monopoly landlord and a tenant protected by limited liability under both adverse selection (based on the tenant’s ability) and moral hazard (based on the tenant’s choice of effort). We identify different optimal contracts depending on the tenant’s outside option. For intermediate values, there is a threshold of tenant ability depending on the outside option level below which the optimal contract is a separating sharecropping contract, and a pooling one otherwise. We also find that an increase in the outside option does not monotonically increase the tenant’s optimal effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian At & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 101(3), pages 941-959.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:101:y:2019:i:3:p:941-959.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ajae/aay049
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Qinan Lu & Xiaodong Du & Huanguang Qiu, 2022. "Adoption patterns and productivity impacts of agricultural mechanization services," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 53(5), pages 826-845, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:101:y:2019:i:3:p:941-959.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.