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Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests

Author

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  • Christian At

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Pierre-Henri Morand

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

This paper analyses jump bidding in ascending auctions in the case of takeover contests. The free riding condition explains that some jumps can occur driven by the own bidders free-rider condition. We also show that ascending auction can be inefficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2008. "Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests," Post-Print hal-00448000, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00448000
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 427-454, June.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    3. At, Christian & Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2011. "Security-voting structure and bidder screening," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 458-476, July.
    4. Michael J. Fishman, 1988. "A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 88-101, Spring.
    5. Bradley, Michael, 1980. "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 345-376, October.
    6. Hirshleifer, David, 1989. "Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt2496649g, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    7. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    8. Holger M. Müller & Fausto Panunzi, 2004. "Tender Offers and Leverage," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1217-1248.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dodonova, Anna, 2017. "Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 214-216.
    2. Dodonova, Anna & Khoroshilov, Yuri, 2014. "Can preemptive bidding in takeover auctions be socially optimal? Yes it can," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 34-47.
    3. Dodonova, Anna, 2013. "Preemptive bidding in takeover auctions with externality," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 35-44.
    4. Anna Dodonova & Yuri Khoroshilov, 2021. "Private Value Takeover Auctions with Toeholds: An Experimental Study," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-10, May.
    5. Dodonova, Anna & Khoroshilov, Yuri, 2020. "Preemptive bidding in common value takeover auctions: Social surplus and the target’s revenue," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    free-riding; takeover; jump bids;
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