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Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts

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  • Amorós, Pablo

Abstract

A group of n≥2 experts has to pick one winner from a group of m≥2 candidates. Different experts may have different judgments about who the best candidate is. A social choice rule (SCR) is q-supermajoritarian (with q≥n2+1) if, whenever a candidate is judged as best by at least q experts, that candidate is considered to be the deserving winner. Experts may be biased and their preferences are not necessarily aligned with their judgments. Then, the social planner has to design a mechanism that implements the SCR. We show that implementability of a q-supermajoritarian SCR in an ordinal equilibrium concept requires the group of experts to satisfy a condition of impartiality that depends on q (the higher q, the weaker the condition).

Suggested Citation

  • Amorós, Pablo, 2021. "Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:207:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521002901
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tamura, Shohei, 2016. "Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 41-46.
    2. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2015. "Symmetry and impartial lotteries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 15-28.
    3. Andrew Mackenzie, 2020. "An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 713-743, April.
    4. Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2013. "Impartial Nominations for a Prize," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 173-196, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; Supermajority rules; Aggregation of experts’ judgments; Impartial experts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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