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La política como fundamento de la libertad

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  • César Mauricio Vallejo Serna

Abstract

¿Qué es la libertad? Su condición semántica de macrovalor explica el margen de ambigüedad tan amplio que ha soportado el concepto en la teoría política. La noción de libertad ha sido tan dúctil que Rousseau llegó a sostener que debía "forzarse al hombre a ser libre" para obligarlo a aceptar el contrato social en caso de que se rehusara. ¿Cómo definir entonces contextualmente un objeto tan esquivo sin extraviarse en elucubraciones que terminan por vaciarlo de un contenido razonable? César Vallejo opta por la mejor-si no la única- metodología posible: nos embarca en un viaje que lo llamaríamos los tres grandes " modelos de libertad" y que se pueden identificar en la historia del pensamiento político.

Suggested Citation

  • César Mauricio Vallejo Serna, 2016. "La política como fundamento de la libertad," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 898.
    • Handle: RePEc:ext:derech:898
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press.
    2. Rae, Douglas W., 1969. "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 40-56, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Floralba Padrón Pardo & Magdalena Correa Henao, 2018. "¿El Estado Constitucional en Jaque? Tomo I. Los retos del componente democrático," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1041, November.

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