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Todo lo que la democracia no es y lo poco que sí: defensa de una concepción democrática realista

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  • José Fernando Flórez Ruiz

Abstract

“Este libro nos sorprende con su exposición de una controversia en el corazón de la teoría democrática. Asume el reto enorme de esas preguntas imposibles que todos creemos poder responder hasta que, con la segunda o tercera crítica, quedamos sin palabras. ¿Qué es la democracia? Intentarlo es como entrar en un laberinto. En 1997 Collier y Levistky encontraron en la literatura 550 posibles respuestas. Si la democracia es “el gobierno del pueblo, por el pueblo, para el pueblo” como dijo Lincoln, ¿deberíamos llamar democrático a un gobierno donde el pueblo ha decidido no gobernarse e investir para ello a un “dictador elegido”? Pero si la democracia impone límites también al pueblo, ¿en qué sentido podríamos decir que la democracia es el gobierno del pueblo? Algunos consideran que la democracia son derechos humanos, justicia, igualdad. ¿Algún ejemplo en este mundo violador de derechos humanos, injusto y desigual?”. / Felipe Rey Salamanca

Suggested Citation

  • José Fernando Flórez Ruiz, 2015. "Todo lo que la democracia no es y lo poco que sí: defensa de una concepción democrática realista," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 780, htpr_v3_i.
    • Handle: RePEc:ext:derech:780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    democracia; gobierno;

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