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A random arrival rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems

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  • Gong, Doudou
  • Dietzenbacher, Bas
  • Peters, Hans

Abstract

This paper introduces and studies a random arrival rule for bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility. This bankruptcy rule generalizes the random arrival rule for bankruptcy problems with transferable utility which assigns the unique efficient allocation proportional to the sum of marginal vectors. We provide two axiomatic characterizations based on symmetry and monotonicity, respectively.

Suggested Citation

  • Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans, 2022. "A random arrival rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:218:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522002567
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110736
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    NTU-bankruptcy problems; random arrival rule; axiomatic analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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