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Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation

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  • Honorata Sosnowska

Abstract

The voting procedure has been presented with rotation scheme used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. The main game theoretical approaches have been presented elsewhere. That paper considered the Shapley value computed in accordance with these approaches. The Banzhaf value has been analysed and the results compared with the results for the Shapley value.

Suggested Citation

  • Honorata Sosnowska, 2014. "Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 24(4), pages 75-88.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:4:y:2014:p:75-88:id:1145
    DOI: 10.5277/ord140406
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2006. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 865-897, December.
    2. Honorata Sosnowska, 2013. "Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 23(1), pages 75-86.
    3. Ansgar Belke & Barbara von Schnurbein, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model: Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 983, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    5. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:44:y:2006:i::p:865-897 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. MoshÚ Machover, 2000. "Notions of A Priori Voting Power: Critique of Holler and WidgrÚn," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 16, pages 415-425.
    7. Marc Roubens & Michel Grabisch, 1999. "An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(4), pages 547-565.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zaremba Leszek & Zaremba Cezary S. & Suchenek Marek, 2017. "Modification of Shapley Value and its Implementation in Decision Making," Foundations of Management, Sciendo, vol. 9(1), pages 257-272, October.

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