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Power Indices And The Measurement Of Control In Corporate Structures

Author

Listed:
  • YVES CRAMA

    (QuantOM, HEC Management School, University of Liège, 4000 Liège, Belgium)

  • LUC LERUTH

    (IMF, Central AFRITAC, Washington DC 20431, USA)

Abstract

This paper proposes a brief review of the use of power indices in the corporate governance literature. Without losing sight of the field of application, it places the emphasis on the game-theoretic aspects of this research and on the issues that arise in this framework. It should be noted that the views presented in this paper are not necessarily those of the IMF.

Suggested Citation

  • Yves Crama & Luc Leruth, 2013. "Power Indices And The Measurement Of Control In Corporate Structures," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(03), pages 1-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:03:n:s0219198913400173
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400173
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    2. Mr. Luc E. Leruth & Mr. Yougesh Khatri & Ms. J. Piesse, 2002. "Corporate Performance and Governance in Malaysia," IMF Working Papers 2002/152, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, 2001. "Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 8633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Adrian Van Deemen & Agnieszka Rusinowska (ed.), 2010. "Collective Decision Making," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-642-02865-6, March.
    5. Hart, Oliver & Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 2001. "Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3073, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Armando Rungi & Gregory Morrison & Fabio Pammolli, 2017. "Global ownership and corporate control networks," Working Papers 07/2017, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, revised Sep 2017.
    2. Karos, Dominik & Peters, Hans, 2018. "Effectivity and power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 363-378.
    3. Luc Leruth & Adnan Mazarei & Pierre Régibeau & Luc Renneboog, 2022. "Green energy depends on critical minerals. Who controls the supply chains?," Working Paper Series WP22-12, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    4. Leruth, Luc & Mazarei, Adnan & Regibeau, Pierre & Renneboog, Luc, 2022. "Green Energy Depends on Critical Minerals. Who Controls the Supply Chains?," Other publications TiSEM 61051d4e-26c6-4cbd-b039-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Stylianos Artsidakis & Yiannis Thalassinos & Theofanis Petropoulos & Konstantinos Liapis, 2022. "Optimum Structure of Corporate Groups," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-16, February.
    6. Hubert, Franz & Orlova, Ekaterina, 2018. "Network access and market power," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 170-185.
    7. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2014. "Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value," Working Papers 2014-05, CRESE.
    8. Ramón Flores & Elisenda Molina & Juan Tejada, 2019. "Evaluating groups with the generalized Shapley value," 4OR, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 141-172, June.
    9. Marc Levy & Ariane Szafarz, 2017. "Cross-Ownership: A Device for Management Entrenchment?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(4), pages 1675-1699.
    10. Takayuki Mizuno & Shohei Doi & Shuhei Kurizaki, 2020. "The power of corporate control in the global ownership network," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(8), pages 1-19, August.
    11. Crama, Yves & Hübner, Georges & Leruth, Luc & Renneboog, Luc, 2021. "Identifying Ultimate Beneficial Owners : A Risk-Based Approach to Improving the Transparency of International Financial Flows," Discussion Paper 2021-027, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Karos, Dominik & Peters, Hans, 2015. "Indirect control and power in mutual control structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 150-165.
    13. Crama, Yves & Hübner, Georges & Leruth, Luc & Renneboog, Luc, 2021. "Identifying Ultimate Beneficial Owners : A Risk-Based Approach to Improving the Transparency of International Financial Flows," Other publications TiSEM eb0e5f55-aca6-4db8-a871-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Simple games; voting; power index; corporate governance; ownership structure; C71 Cooperative Games; G3 Corporate Finance and Governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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