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Corporate control activism

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  • Corum, Adrian Aycan
  • Levit, Doron

Abstract

This paper studies the role of activist investors in the market for corporate control. Our theory proposes that activist investors have an inherent advantage relative to bidders in pressuring entrenched incumbents to sell. As counterparties to the acquisition, bidders have a fundamental conflict of interests with target shareholders from which activist investors are immune. Therefore, unlike activists, the ability of bidders to win proxy fights is very limited. This result is consistent with the large number of activist campaigns that have resulted with the target’s sale to a third party and the evidence that most proxy fights are launched by activists, not by bidders.

Suggested Citation

  • Corum, Adrian Aycan & Levit, Doron, 2019. "Corporate control activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:133:y:2019:i:1:p:1-17
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.02.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Brav & Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, 2019. "Dancing With Activists," NBER Working Papers 26171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Corum, Adrian Aycan, 2021. "Fighting Fire with Fire: Optimality of Value Destruction to Mitigate Short-Termism," OSF Preprints xhwmg, Center for Open Science.
    3. Aiken, Adam L. & Lee, Choonsik, 2020. "Let's talk sooner rather than later: The strategic communication decisions of activist blockholders," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    4. Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Corum, Adrian Aycan & Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya, 2020. "Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment," OSF Preprints 8n6xj, Center for Open Science.
    6. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2022. "Activism and Takeovers," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(4), pages 1868-1896.
    7. Johnson, Travis L. & Swem, Nathan, 2021. "Reputation and investor activism: A structural approach," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 29-56.
    8. Kim, Sehoon, 2020. "Disappearing Discounts: Hedge Fund Activism in Conglomerates," MPRA Paper 100876, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Ordóñez-Calafí, Guillem & Thanassoulis, John, 2020. "Stock selling during takeovers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    10. Hege, Ulrich & Zhang, Yifei, 2022. "Activism Waves and the Market for Corporate Assets," TSE Working Papers 22-1397, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    11. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Brav, Alon & Jiang, Wei & Keusch, Thomas, 2020. "Dancing with activists," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 1-41.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Acquisition; Corporate governance; Proxy fight; Shareholder activism; Takeover;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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