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Evaluating groups with the generalized Shapley value

Author

Listed:
  • Ramón Flores

    (IMUS-Universidad de Sevilla)

  • Elisenda Molina

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  • Juan Tejada

    (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

Abstract

Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person interaction situation, we intend to apply the Shapley generalized value (introduced formally in Marichal et al. in Discrete Appl Math 155:26–43, 2007) as a tool for the assessment of a group of players that act as a unit in a coalitional game. We propose an alternative axiomatic characterization which does not use a direct formulation of the classical efficiency property. Relying on this valuation, we also analyze the profitability of a group. We motivate this use of the Shapley generalized value by means of two relevant applications in which it is used as an objective function by a decision maker who is trying to identify an optimal group of agents in a framework in which agents interact and the attained benefit can be modeled by means of a transferable utility game.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramón Flores & Elisenda Molina & Juan Tejada, 2019. "Evaluating groups with the generalized Shapley value," 4OR, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 141-172, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:aqjoor:v:17:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s10288-018-0380-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10288-018-0380-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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