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A Note On Passepartout Problems

Author

Listed:
  • ARANTZA ESTÉVEZ-FERNÁNDEZ

    (Tinbergen Institute and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands)

  • PETER BORM

    (CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands)

  • HERBERT HAMERS

    (CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands)

Abstract

This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system, a group of service providers offers a passepartout that allows its owners the use of specified services for an unlimited number of times during a fixed period of time. The corresponding allocation problem is, then, how to share the total joint revenues of the passepartout system adequately among the service providers. Arguments are provided to model a passepartout problem within the framework of bankruptcy and context-specific properties are considered in order to select an appropriate allocation rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2012. "A Note On Passepartout Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(02), pages 1-9.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:14:y:2012:i:02:n:s0219198912500132
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198912500132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    2. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2006. "Proportionality And Non-Manipulability In Bankruptcy Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 127-139.
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    Cited by:

    1. Balbina Casas-Mendez & Vito Fragnelli & Ignacio Garcìa-Jurado, 2014. "A survey of allocation rules for the museum pass problem," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 38(2), pages 191-205, May.
    2. BERGANTIÑOS, Gustavo & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., 2016. "A New Rule for the Problem of Sharing the Revenue from Museum Passes," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2721, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Casas-Méndez, Balbina & Fragnelli, Vito & García-Jurado, Ignacio, 2011. "Weighted bankruptcy rules and the museum pass problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(1), pages 161-168, November.
    4. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2013. "The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing," Working Papers 13.04, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    5. Arantza Estévez-Fernández & José Manuel Giménez-Gómez & María José Solís-Baltadano, 2019. "Sequential bankruptcy problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-076/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Elisenda Molina & Juan Tejada & Tom Weiss, 2022. "Some game theoretic marketing attribution models," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1043-1075, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Passepartout problem; bankruptcy problem; allocation rule; D02; C70;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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