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Proportionality And Non-Manipulability In Bankruptcy Problems

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  • JUAN D. MORENO-TERNERO

    (Universidad de Málaga and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

We explore the relationship between proportionality and manipulation (via merging or splitting agents' claims) in bankruptcy problems. We provide an alternative proof to the well-known result that, in an unrestricted domain, immunity to manipulation is equivalent to requiring proportional division. We show that this result also holds for restricted (but sufficiently rich) domains, such as the domain of simple problems and the domain of zero-normalized problems. Finally, we characterize two adjustments of the proportional rule by combining non-manipulabilty on these domains and the usual axioms of independence of claims truncation and composition from minimal rights.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2006. "Proportionality And Non-Manipulability In Bankruptcy Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 127-139.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:n:s0219198906000825
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906000825
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    Cited by:

    1. Emin Karagözoğlu, 2014. "A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 217(1), pages 299-318, June.
    2. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2013. "Coalitional manipulation on networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 627-662.
    3. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter, 2021. "On manipulability in financial systems," Working Papers 2072/534916, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    4. Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2023. "An Axiomatization of the Pairwise Netting Proportional Rule in Financial Networks," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 2301, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    5. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc, 2022. "Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    6. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena, 2023. "Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: an axiomatic approach," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/442, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Alfredo Valencia-Toledo & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2020. "Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 173-193, March.
    8. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter, 2023. "Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 61-64.
    9. Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2015. "Non-manipulable rules for land rental problems," MPRA Paper 67334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2021. "An Axiomatization of the Proportional Rule in Financial Networks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 2799-2812, May.
    11. Csóka, Péter, 2017. "Az arányos csődszabály karakterizációja körbetartozások esetén [The characterization of the proportional rule in the case of circular liabilities]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 930-942.
    12. Takayuki Oishi, 2018. "Legal and Political Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Water Shortage," Discussion Papers 39, Meisei University, School of Economics.
    13. Thomson, William, 2015. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-59.
    14. Sudhölter, Peter & Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc, 2023. "A note on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split," Discussion Papers on Economics 1/2023, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    15. Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2012. "A Note On Passepartout Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(02), pages 1-9.
    16. Karol Flores-Szwagrzak & Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2020. "Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 559-579, April.
    17. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc, 2024. "Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    18. Doudou Gong & Genjiu Xu & Xuanzhu Jin & Loyimee Gogoi, 2022. "A sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 30(2), pages 359-379, July.
    19. Teresa Estañ & Natividad Llorca & Ricardo Martínez & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2020. "Manipulability in the cost allocation of transport systems," ThE Papers 20/08, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    20. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena, 2022. "Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/426, University of Barcelona School of Economics.

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      Keywords

      Bankruptcy problems; proportional allocation; manipulation via merging or splitting; axiomatic characterizations; JEL Classification Code: D63;
      All these keywords.

      JEL classification:

      • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
      • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
      • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
      • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
      • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
      • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
      • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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