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Coalitional manipulation on networks

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  • Ju, Biung-Ghi

Abstract

We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed graph) so that only connected subsets of agents can form a coalition. We offer a full characterization of non-manipulable rules without any assumption on the network structure. This result yields a variety of useful corollaries for specific networks such as complete network, trees, and networks without a “bridge”, and corollaries for specialized models dealing with bankruptcy, surplus sharing, cost sharing, income redistribution, social choice with transferable utility, etc.

Suggested Citation

  • Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2013. "Coalitional manipulation on networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 627-662.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:627-662
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2016. "Non-bossiness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 665-696, October.
    2. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Tvede, Mich & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 98-110.
    3. Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
    4. László Á. Kóczy, 2022. "Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1001-1027, November.
    5. Thomson, William, 2015. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-59.
    6. Sudhölter, Peter & Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc, 2023. "A note on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split," Discussion Papers on Economics 1/2023, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    7. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc, 2024. "Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    8. Takayuki Oishi & Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2018. "The Tort Law and the Nucleolus for Generalized Joint Liability Problems," Discussion Papers 37, Meisei University, School of Economics.
    9. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc, 2022. "Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    10. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena, 2023. "Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: an axiomatic approach," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/442, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Alfredo Valencia-Toledo & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2020. "Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 173-193, March.
    12. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter, 2023. "Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 61-64.
    13. Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2015. "Non-manipulable rules for land rental problems," MPRA Paper 67334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Juarez, Ruben & Nitta, Kohei & Vargas, Miguel, 2021. "Coalitional efficient profit-sharing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    15. Zou, Zhengxing & Tan, Zhibin, 2023. "Axiomatizations of convex compromise rules for redistribution of non-negative income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    16. Christian Basteck & Frank Huettner, 2023. "Coalitional Manipulations and Immunity of the Shapley Value," Papers 2310.20415, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Allocation problem; Coalitional manipulation; Network; Reallocation-proofness; No advantageous reallocation; Strategy-proofness; Non-manipulability by merging or splitting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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