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A survey of allocation rules for the museum pass problem

Author

Listed:
  • Balbina Casas-Mendez
  • Vito Fragnelli
  • Ignacio Garcìa-Jurado

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem, introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (Games Econ Behav 43:322–325, 2003 ), of sharing the income from the sell of passes that allow the entrance in a set of museums. First, we recall some allocation rules and some properties presented in Ginsburgh and Zang (Mus Manag Curatorship 19:371–383, 2004 ), Béal and Solal (Rev Econ 61:1099–1109, 2010 ), Estévez-Fernández et al. ( 2010 ), and Casas-Méndez et al. (Eur J Oper Res 215:161–168, 2011 ). Then, we discuss them, finding the properties satisfied by each allocation rule. The analysis of a real-world example concludes the paper. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Balbina Casas-Mendez & Vito Fragnelli & Ignacio Garcìa-Jurado, 2014. "A survey of allocation rules for the museum pass problem," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 38(2), pages 191-205, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:38:y:2014:i:2:p:191-205
    DOI: 10.1007/s10824-013-9202-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. ,, 2001. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(6), pages 1157-1160, December.
    2. Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2012. "A Note On Passepartout Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(02), pages 1-9.
    3. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    4. Ginsburgh, Victor & Zang, Israel, 2003. "The museum pass game and its value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 322-325, May.
    5. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
    6. Casas-Méndez, Balbina & Fragnelli, Vito & García-Jurado, Ignacio, 2011. "Weighted bankruptcy rules and the museum pass problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(1), pages 161-168, November.
    7. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2001. "The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 307-328, November.
    8. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
    9. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
    10. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2013. "The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing," Working Papers 13.04, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    2. Arantza Estévez-Fernández & José Manuel Giménez-Gómez & María José Solís-Baltadano, 2019. "Sequential bankruptcy problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-076/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Bruce Seaman, 2017. "¿Qué está en juego al optar entre distintas formas de apoyo para el sector cultural?," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(146), pages 121-162.
    4. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2015. "The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 78-92.
    5. Victor Ginsburgh & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2023. "The Eurovision Song Contest: voting rules, biases and rationality," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 47(2), pages 247-277, June.
    6. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2016. "A new rule for the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes," Working Papers 16.02, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    7. Elisenda Molina & Juan Tejada & Tom Weiss, 2022. "Some game theoretic marketing attribution models," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1043-1075, November.
    8. Vito Fragnelli & Gianfranco Gambarelli, 2014. "Further open problems in cooperative games," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 24(4), pages 51-62.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Museum pass problem; Allocation rules; Shapley value; Bankruptcy; C71; D79;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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