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Survival And Extinction In The Replicator Model: Dynamics And Statistics

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  • SEBASTIÁN BOUZAT

    (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Centro Atómico Bariloche and Instituto Balseiro, 8400 San Carlos de Bariloche, Río Negro, Argentina)

  • DAMIÁN H. ZANETTE

    (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Centro Atómico Bariloche and Instituto Balseiro, 8400 San Carlos de Bariloche, Río Negro, Argentina)

Abstract

We study the multi-species replicator model with linear fitness and random fitness matrices of various classes. By means of numerical resolution of the replicator equations, we determine the survival probability of a species in terms of its average interaction with the rest of the system. The role of the interaction pattern of the ecosystem in defining survival and extinction probabilities is emphasized.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastián Bouzat & Damián H. Zanette, 2003. "Survival And Extinction In The Replicator Model: Dynamics And Statistics," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(02), pages 223-240.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:06:y:2003:i:02:n:s0219525903000815
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219525903000815
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, April.
    2. Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692198, April.
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