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Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR

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  • Russell S. Sobel
  • Todd M. Nesbit

Abstract

When safety regulation makes automobiles safer, drivers may drive more recklessly, partially or completely offsetting effects on the overall level of safety. Evidence of these offsetting effects has been hard to find, however, primarily because of the aggregate nature of accident data. In this paper we explore how changes in the safety of automobiles used in the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) has altered the incentive of drivers to drive recklessly. This unique data set allows more accurate and objective measurement of the necessary variables to test for these effects at a microlevel. Our results strongly support the presence of these offsetting behavioral effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell S. Sobel & Todd M. Nesbit, 2007. "Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 71-84, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:74:y:2007:i:1:p:71-84
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00827.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeffrey Cisyk & Pascal Courty, 2024. "An Economic Approach to Sports Injury Policies," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 25(3), pages 388-419, April.

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