IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/regeco/v4y1992i4p335-46.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Public Regulation of Private Accident Risk: The Moral Hazard of Technological Improvements

Author

Listed:
  • Risa, Alf Erling

Abstract

This paper discusses individual agents' incentives to take precautions to prevent accidents when the prevention technology facing the agents is changed due to regulation. It is shown that private prevention activities vary greatly with different attitudes towards risk. This is a great potential problem for the implementation of several types of legal regulation of individuals' precautionary level, like negligence rules. In this case, regulators need to observe the true preferences of the regulated agents to implement the optimal program. One novel feature of the present analysis is that only simple properties of the prevention technology need to be known to identify potential incentive problems, regardless of the underlying preferences. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Risa, Alf Erling, 1992. "Public Regulation of Private Accident Risk: The Moral Hazard of Technological Improvements," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 335-346, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:4:y:1992:i:4:p:335-46
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Traynor, 2003. "The impact of safety regulations on externalities," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 31(1), pages 62-70, March.
    2. Bardal, Kjersti Granås & Jørgensen, Finn, 2017. "Valuing the risk and social costs of road traffic accidents – Seasonal variation and the significance of delay costs," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 10-19.
    3. Russell S. Sobel & Todd M. Nesbit, 2007. "Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 71-84, July.
    4. Hoy, Michael & Polborn, Mattias K., 2015. "The value of technology improvements in games with externalities: A fresh look at offsetting behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 12-20.
    5. Adam Pope & Robert Tollison, 2010. "“Rubbin’ is racin''': evidence of the Peltzman effect from NASCAR," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 507-513, March.
    6. Pål Andreas Pedersen, 2001. "A Game Theoretical Approach to Road Safety," Studies in Economics 0105, School of Economics, University of Kent.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:4:y:1992:i:4:p:335-46. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.