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Estimating the Offsetting Effects of Driver Behavior in Response to Safety Regulation: The Case of Formula One Racing

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  • Potter Joel M

    (North Georgia College & State University)

Abstract

Using a unique dataset, this paper empirically tests the Peltzman effect by investigating the behavior of Formula One racecar drivers. Estimates suggest that drivers become more reckless as their cars become safer, ceteris paribus. From 1963-1973, safety changes, on average, are estimated to leave the number of driver casualties unchanged. Furthermore, this is the first attempt to estimate specifically how drivers respond to changes in the conditional probability of fatality given an accident. Results provide evidence that the behavioral response of drivers is larger when the analysis is confined to changes in the conditional probability of a fatality given an accident.

Suggested Citation

  • Potter Joel M, 2011. "Estimating the Offsetting Effects of Driver Behavior in Response to Safety Regulation: The Case of Formula One Racing," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 1-22, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jqsprt:v:7:y:2011:i:3:n:1
    DOI: 10.2202/1559-0410.1276
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Pascal Courty & Jeffrey Cisyk, 2024. "Sports injuries and game stakes: Concussions in the National Football League," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(1), pages 430-448, January.
    4. Onur Burak Celik, 2020. "Survival of Formula One Drivers," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1271-1281, July.
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    6. Wright, Mike, 2014. "OR analysis of sporting rules – A survey," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 232(1), pages 1-8.

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