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Evaluating the effects of automobile safety regulation

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  • John D. Graham
  • Steven Garber

Abstract

Automobile safety standards adopted because of federal legislation have, according to many researchers, failed to save lives; safer cars, they infer, induce more dangerous driving. Results from the major study suggesting this conclusion are shown, however, to be quite sensitive to reasonable changes in the empirical model. An alternative statistical analysis of death rates supports a very different conclusion: Safety standards have saved tens of thousands of lives during the 1970s. More broadly, the article illustrates some general pitfalls in using statistical results in policy analysis, and how they can be avoided.

Suggested Citation

  • John D. Graham & Steven Garber, 1984. "Evaluating the effects of automobile safety regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 3(2), pages 206-224.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:3:y:1984:i:2:p:206-224
    DOI: 10.1002/pam.4050030204
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    Cited by:

    1. John D. Graham & Max Henrion, 1984. "A Probabilistic Analysis of the Passive–Restraint Question," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 25-40, March.
    2. Peterson, Steven & Hoffer, George & Millner, Edward, 1995. "Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 251-264, October.
    3. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
    4. Noland, Robert B., 2013. "From theory to practice in road safety policy: Understanding risk versus mobility," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 71-84.
    5. J. Brian O'Roark & William C. Wood, 2004. "Safety at the Racetrack: Results of Restrictor Plates in Superspeedway Competition," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(1), pages 118-129, July.
    6. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Picard, Pierre, 2007. "Point-record driving licence and road safety: An economic approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 235-258, February.
    7. W. Kip Viscusi & Gerald O. Cavallo, 1994. "The Effect of Product Safety Regulation on Safety Precautions," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(6), pages 917-930, December.
    8. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2007. "Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data," Working Papers hal-00243056, HAL.
    9. McCarthy, Patrick S, 1995. "The 1982 Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA): Implications of relaxed truck weight and size limits for highway safety," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 107-117, April.
    10. Aparicio Izquierdo, Francisco & Arenas Ramírez, Blanca & Bernardos Rodríguez, Eva, 2013. "The interurban DRAG-Spain model: The main factors of influence on road accidents in Spain," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 57-65.
    11. Semmens, John & Kresich, Dianne, 1987. "What If Everything We Know About Safety Is Wrong?," Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, Transportation Research Forum, vol. 28(1).
    12. Potter Joel M, 2011. "Estimating the Offsetting Effects of Driver Behavior in Response to Safety Regulation: The Case of Formula One Racing," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 1-22, July.
    13. Russell S. Sobel & Todd M. Nesbit, 2007. "Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 71-84, July.

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