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Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years

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  • Jac C. Heckelman

Abstract

In the quarter century since the publication of Mancur Olson's Rise and Decline of Nations, a large literature has evolved testing the central hypothesis regarding Olson's thesis on institutional sclerosis. These tests have taken the form of both econometric regression analysis involving a sample of various nations and detailed narrative case studies of specific nations. Tests have appeared in both economics and political science journals as well as in collected volumes and independent books, performed primarily by authors from America and Europe. A review of over 50 separate works reveals that, on the whole, the theory of institutional sclerosis is generally but certainly not universally supported. No systematic bias in favor of or opposition to Olson is found to have arisen on the basis of methodology, publication outlet, or authorship location.

Suggested Citation

  • Jac C. Heckelman, 2007. "Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 18-33, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:74:y:2007:i:1:p:18-33
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00824.x
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