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Interest Groups and Investment: A Further Test of the Olson Hypothesis

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  • Coates, Dennis
  • Heckelman, Jac C

Abstract

Mancur Olson's institutional sclerosis hypothesis may be evident in the effects of interest groups on investment in physical capital. To test this proposition, we use cross sectional data on 42 countries for which information on the number of interest groups is available to estimate the effect of those groups on the share of GDP that goes into physical investment. The results indicate that interest groups have a different effect on physical investment in OECD and non-OECD countries. In the OECD countries, we find support for the hypothesis that interest groups harm investment in physical capital. In developing countries, interest groups either have no effect on physical investment or they have a slight beneficial impact. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Coates, Dennis & Heckelman, Jac C, 2003. "Interest Groups and Investment: A Further Test of the Olson Hypothesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(3-4), pages 333-340, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:117:y:2003:i:3-4:p:333-40
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Horgos & Klaus W. Zimmermann, 2010. "It Takes Two to Tango: Lobbies and the Political Business Cycle," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 383-399, August.
    2. Sabatini, Fabio, 2009. "Does social capital create trust? Evidence from a community of entrepreneurs," AICCON Working Papers 58-2009, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    3. Coates, Dennis & Heckelman, Jac C. & Wilson, Bonnie, 2010. "The political economy of investment: Sclerotic effects from interest groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 208-221, June.
    4. Călin Vâlsan & Zizi Goschin & Elena Druică, 2023. "The Measurement of Social Capital in America: A Reassessment," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 135-161, January.
    5. Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2011. "Special-interest groups and growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 439-457, June.
    6. Bonnie Wilson & Jac Heckelman & Dennis Coates, 2007. "Special-Interest Groups and Volatility," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(18), pages 1-13.
    7. Yakovlev, Andrei & Govorun, Andrei, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," IWH Discussion Papers 16/2011, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    8. Daniel Horgos & Klaus Zimmermann, 2009. "Interest groups and economic performance: some new evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 301-315, March.
    9. Justin Conrad & Hong-Cheol Kim & Mark Souva, 2013. "Narrow interests and military resource allocation in autocratic regimes," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 50(6), pages 737-750, November.
    10. Neyapti, Bilin, 2013. "Modeling institutional evolution," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-16.
    11. Andrei Yakovlev & Andrei Govorun, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 116, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    12. Michele Hoyman & Jamie McCall & Laurie Paarlberg & John Brennan, 2016. "Considering the Role of Social Capital for Economic Development Outcomes in U.S. Counties," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 30(4), pages 342-357, November.
    13. Neira, I. & Portela, M. & Vieira, E., 2010. "Social Capital and growth in European regions," Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 10(2).
    14. Jac C. Heckelman, 2007. "Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 18-33, July.
    15. Domenico Rossignoli, 2015. "Too many and too much? Special-interest groups and inequality at the turn of the century," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 130(3), pages 337-366.
    16. Cole, Ismail M., 2014. "Short- and long-term growth effects of special interest groups in the U.S. states: A dynamic panel error-correction approach," MPRA Paper 54455, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Mar 2014.
    17. Taner Güney, 2015. "Environmental sustainability and pressure groups," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 49(6), pages 2331-2344, November.
    18. Yakovlev, A. & Govorun, A., 2011. "Business Associations as a Business-Government Liaison: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 9, pages 98-127.
    19. Nicola Cortinovis & Jing Xiao & Ron Boschma & Frank G van Oort, 2017. "Quality of government and social capital as drivers of regional diversification in Europe," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(6), pages 1179-1208.
    20. Pittaluga, Giovanni B. & Reghezza, Alessio & Seghezza, Elena, 2020. "Reconsidering the modernization hypothesis: The role of diversified production and interest‐group competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    21. Bilin Neyapti, 2010. "Macroeconomic Institutions and Development," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12960.
    22. Erik E. Lehmann & Nikolaus Seitz, 2017. "Freedom and innovation: a country and state level analysis," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 42(5), pages 1009-1029, October.

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