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On Voting: A Public Choice Approach By Gordon Tullock. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998. Pp. ix, 208. $70.00

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  • Richard F. Potthoff

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  • Richard F. Potthoff, 1999. "On Voting: A Public Choice Approach By Gordon Tullock. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998. Pp. ix, 208. $70.00," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(1), pages 204-208, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:66:y:1999:i:1:p:204-208
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00240.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
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