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Risk‐Mitigating Policies and Adversarial Behavior: Case of Backlash

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  • Hamid Mohtadi

Abstract

A probabilistic game‐theoretic model is developed within both a static and a dynamic framework to capture adversary–defender conflict in the presence of backlash. I find that not accounting for backlash in counteradversary policies may be costly to the target government. But to minimize adversarial backlash requires understanding how backlash emerges and if, and how, adversaries strategize to goad target governments into policies that induce backlash. The dynamic version of the model shows that when backlash occurs with a time lag, an escalation of the conflict is likely to occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamid Mohtadi, 2017. "Risk‐Mitigating Policies and Adversarial Behavior: Case of Backlash," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 459-470, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:riskan:v:37:y:2017:i:3:p:459-470
    DOI: 10.1111/risa.12636
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Neil Johnson & Michael Spagat & Jorge A. Restrepo & Nicolás Suárez, 2005. "From old wars to new wars and global terrorism," Documentos de Economía 2745, Universidad Javeriana - Bogotá.
    2. Hamid Mohtadi & Antu Panini Murshid, 2009. "Risk of catastrophic terrorism: an extreme value approach," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(4), pages 537-559.
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    5. Hamid Mohtadi & Swati Agiwal, 2012. "Optimal Security Investments and Extreme Risk," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(8), pages 1309-1325, August.
    6. Daniel G. Arce & Todd Sandler, 2010. "Terrorist Spectaculars: Backlash Attacks and the Focus of Intelligence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(2), pages 354-373, April.
    7. Edward H. Kaplan & Alex Mintz & Shaul Mishal, 2006. "Tactical Prevention of Suicide Bombings in Israel," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 36(6), pages 553-561, December.
    8. Bruno S. Frey, 2004. "Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot?," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3435.
    9. Siqueira, Kevin & Sandler, Todd, 2007. "Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1800-1815, September.
    10. Hamid Mohtadi & Antu Panini Murshid, 2009. "Risk Analysis of Chemical, Biological, or Radionuclear Threats: Implications for Food Security," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(9), pages 1317-1335, September.
    11. João Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2012. "Counterterrorism And Its Impact On Terror Support And Recruitment: Accounting For Backlash," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 431-445, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Qing Lan & Xiaojun Li, 2019. "Liability Determination of School Sports Injury Accidents: An Analysis Framework Based on Evolutionary Game," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(18), pages 1-19, September.

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