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Information provision as agenda setting: A study of bureaucracy's role in higher education policy

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  • Tracey Bark

Abstract

Many drivers of agenda setting have been considered in political science, yet the bureaucracy has been largely absent from these discussions. This article challenges that tendency by arguing that bureaucracies provide information and analysis to legislatures early in the policy process, which then affects the bills that are introduced and eventually adopted. I further posit that institutional forms condition the information a bureaucracy can provide, leading to the central hypothesis that highly centralized agencies have more concentrated agendas than decentralized institutions and therefore less congruence with and influence on legislative agendas. Based on a large original dataset of bureaucratic information and proposed legislation concerning higher education policy from two states with archetypal institutional forms, I analyze what kinds of information shift the attention of lawmakers to higher education topics of interest within different institutional arrangements. The findings further our understanding of the impact of institutional factors on information processing by legislatures and the role of the bureaucracy in agenda setting.

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  • Tracey Bark, 2021. "Information provision as agenda setting: A study of bureaucracy's role in higher education policy," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 408-427, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:15:y:2021:i:2:p:408-427
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12293
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