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Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation

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  • Carpenter, Daniel P.

Abstract

Control over agency budgets is a critical tool of political influence in regulatory decision making, yet the causal mechanism of budgetary control is unclear. Do budgetary manipulations influence agencies by imposing resource constraints or by transmitting powerful signals to the agency? I advance and test a stochastic process model of adaptive signal processing by a hierarchical agency to address this question. The principal findings of the paper are two. First, presidents and congressional committees achieve budgetary control over agencies not by manipulating aggregate resource constraints but by transmitting powerful signals through budget shifts. Second, bureaucratic hierarchy increases the agency's response time in processing budgetary signals, limiting the efficacy of the budget as a device of political control. I also show that the magnitude of agency response to budgetary signals increased for executive-branch agencies after 1970 due to executive oversight reforms. I conclude by discussing the limits of budgetary manipulations as a device of political control and the response of elected authorities to adaptive signal processing by agencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Carpenter, Daniel P., 1996. "Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(2), pages 283-302, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:02:p:283-302_20
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    6. Andrew B. Whitford, 2002. "Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 167-193, April.
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    11. Matthew E.K. Hall, 2017. "Macro Implementation: Testing the Causal Paths from U.S. Macro Policy to Federal Incarceration," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 438-455, April.
    12. Tracey Bark, 2021. "Information provision as agenda setting: A study of bureaucracy's role in higher education policy," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 408-427, April.
    13. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    14. Jodi L. Short, 2021. "The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 653-685, July.
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    16. Olson, Mary K, 1999. "Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, Regulation, and Industry Compliance," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 573-601, October.
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