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Exploring the relationship between performance management and program impact: A case study of the job training partnership act

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  • Burt S Barnow

    (Director for Research, Institute for Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins University.)

Abstract

Programs that involve multiple levels of government may suffer from a principal-agent problem: Lower levels of government may wish to pursue different objectives than the higher level of government that provides funding. One strategy for dealing with this problem is to establish a performance management system where units operating the program are accountable for meeting performance standards and are rewarded or sanctioned depending on how well they perform. Title II-A of the Job Training Partnership Act provides training for economically disadvantaged adults and has operated under a performance management system since 1983 when the program was established. The federal government's goal for the program is to maximize impact on the employment and earnings of participants, but because control groups are not available for the 640 local programs, proxy measures of performance must be used. In this paper, data from an experiment in 16 sites are used to determine how closely measured performance corresponds to program impact. It is concluded that there is only a weak correspondence between the two measures and that the Department of Labor should avoid making significant rewards or sanctions based on the current performance management system. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Suggested Citation

  • Burt S Barnow, 2000. "Exploring the relationship between performance management and program impact: A case study of the job training partnership act," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(1), pages 118-141.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:19:y:2000:i:1:p:118-141
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(200024)19:1<118::AID-PAM7>3.0.CO;2-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2017. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 117-141, October.
    2. Corrado Cuccurullo & Massimo Aria & Fabrizia Sarto, 2016. "Foundations and trends in performance management. A twenty-five years bibliometric analysis in business and public administration domains," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 108(2), pages 595-611, August.
    3. Christian Adam & Yves Steinebach & Christoph Knill, 2018. "Neglected challenges to evidence-based policy-making: the problem of policy accumulation," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 51(3), pages 269-290, September.
    4. Robert Olsen & Dan Levy, "undated". "Program Performance and the President's Budget: Do OMB's PART Scores Really Matter?," Mathematica Policy Research Reports f0cf941d1ae94098a2470990a, Mathematica Policy Research.
    5. Burt S. Barnow & Jeffrey Smith, 2015. "Employment and Training Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, Volume 2, pages 127-234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Deborah Cobb‐Clark & Chris Ryan & Robert Breunig, 2006. "A Couples‐Based Approach to the Problem of Workless Families," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 82(259), pages 428-444, December.
    7. Bruno Crépon & Marc Ferracci & Denis Fougere, 2012. "Training the Unemployed in France: How Does it Affect Unemployment Duration and Recurrence?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 107-108, pages 175-199.
    8. Peter Z. Schochet & John A. Burghardt, 2008. "Do Job Corps performance measures track program impacts?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(3), pages 556-576.
    9. Jun Li, 2022. "Value‐Based Payments in Health Care: Evidence from a Nationwide Randomized Experiment in the Home Health Sector," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(4), pages 1090-1117, September.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12197 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Pascal Courty & Gerald Marschke, 2003. "Making Government Accountable: Lessons from a Federal Job Training Program," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/083, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    12. S. Avdasheva & S. Golovanova & Y. Katsoulacos, 2019. "Optimal Institutional Structure of Competition Authorities Under Reputation Maximization: A Model and Empirical Evidence from the Case of Russia," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 251-282, March.
    13. McBeath, Bowen & Meezan, William, 2009. "Interorganizational disparities in foster care service provision," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 513-525, May.
    14. Deborah A. Cobb‐Clark & Thomas Crossley, 2003. "Econometrics for Evaluations: An Introduction to Recent Developments," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(247), pages 491-511, December.

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