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Policy monitoring and policy analysis

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  • Richard W. Waterman
  • B. Dan Wood

Abstract

In this article we introduce a policy analytic technique that we call “policy monitoring.” Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency's Hazardous Waste Division, we demonstrate how the technique can be employed in actual practice. The case study demonstrates that EPA enforcements were responsive to stimuli emanating from outside the agency. In particular, relevant congressional committees were able to influence and effect change in the EPA's policy. In addition to demonstrating how policy monitoring can be employed, we also discuss how it can be used in other policy analytic situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard W. Waterman & B. Dan Wood, 1993. "Policy monitoring and policy analysis," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 685-699.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:12:y:1993:i:4:p:685-699
    DOI: 10.2307/3325346
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wood, B. Dan, 1988. "Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 213-234, March.
    2. Wood, B. Dan & Waterman, Richard W., 1991. "The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 801-828, September.
    3. David D. Hale, 1986. "Analysis," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(5), pages 52-56, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jonas J. Schoenefeld, 2021. "The European Green Deal: What Prospects for Governing Climate Change With Policy Monitoring?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(3), pages 370-379.
    2. Ellen Seljan, 2014. "The limits of tax and expenditure limits: TEL implementation as a principal-agent problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 485-501, June.
    3. Bisang, Kurt & Zimmermann, Willi, 2006. "Key concepts and methods of programme evaluation and conclusions from forestry practice in Switzerland," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(5), pages 502-511, July.
    4. Jean H. Peretz & Robert A. Bohm & Philip D. Jasienczyk, 1997. "Environmental policy and the reduction of hazardous waste," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(4), pages 556-574.
    5. Blank, Lorraine & Grosh, Margaret, 1999. "Using Household Surveys to Build Analytic Capacity," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 14(2), pages 209-227, August.

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