IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/reggov/v14y2020i2p271-294.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Anatomy of agency capture: An organizational typology for diagnosing and remedying capture

Author

Listed:
  • Justin Rex

Abstract

Recent crises and disasters in regulated industries have renewed scholarly attention to regulatory capture. The present research incorporates and builds on these efforts by creating a typology to help researchers and practitioners organize the capture literature. The typology has two dimensions: the degree of coordination within the regulated industry, the agents of capture; and the scope of capture within the agency and elected officials, the targets of capture. I illustrate the utility of the typology by using a case study of banking regulation before the 2008 global financial crisis. The case study uses process‐tracing methodology to weigh evidence about the role and scope of capture in creating the crisis. The contributions of this research are twofold. First, for capture theory, the typology assists in organizing the disparate, multidisciplinary research on capture mechanisms and remedies. Second, for practice, this organization can lead to more accurate diagnoses about the scope of capture and suggest appropriately tailored remedies.

Suggested Citation

  • Justin Rex, 2020. "Anatomy of agency capture: An organizational typology for diagnosing and remedying capture," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(2), pages 271-294, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:14:y:2020:i:2:p:271-294
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12209
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12209
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/rego.12209?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carpenter,Daniel & Moss,David A. (ed.), 2013. "Preventing Regulatory Capture," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107036086, January.
    2. Wood, B. Dan & Waterman, Richard W., 1991. "The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 801-828, September.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
    4. Carpenter, Daniel P., 2004. "Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 613-631, November.
    5. Per J. Agrell & Axel Gautier, 2017. "A Theory of Soft Capture," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(3), pages 571-596, July.
    6. Makkai, Toni & Braithwaite, John, 1992. "In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 61-78, January.
    7. Carpenter,Daniel & Moss,David A. (ed.), 2013. "Preventing Regulatory Capture," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646704, January.
    8. Mario Mariniello & Damien Neven & Jorge Padilla, 2015. "Antitrust, regulatory capture and economic integration," Policy Contributions 891, Bruegel.
    9. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ahmed Fouad El Haddad, 2024. "Beyond regulatory capture: Policy entrepreneurs' strategies in regulatory policies under authoritarianism," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 41(6), pages 961-984, November.
    2. Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, 2021. "Designing Regulation Across Organizations: Assessing the Functions and Dimensions of Governance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(S1), pages 102-122, November.
    3. Keyser, John D., 2023. "Examine the available evidence: Was the Duhnke PCAOB captured?," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    4. Perri 6 & Eva Heims & Martha Prevezer, 2023. "How did international economic regulation survive the last period of deglobalization?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 272-289, January.
    5. Jackson, William A., 2024. "Markets as Dualistic, Semi-Decentralized Organizations," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 153-172.
    6. Minniti, Maria & Naudé, Wim & Stam, Erik, 2023. "Is Productive Entrepreneurship Getting Scarcer? A Reflection on the Contemporary Relevance of Baumol's Typology," IZA Discussion Papers 16408, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Adam William Chalmers & Robyn Klingler‐Vidra & Alfio Puglisi & Lisa Remke, 2022. "In and out of revolving doors in European Union financial regulatory authorities," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1233-1249, October.
    8. Henk Erik Meier & Borja García & Serhat Yilmaz & Webster Chakawata, 2023. "The Capture of EU Football Regulation by the Football Governing Bodies," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 692-711, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Charles Sabel & Gary Herrigel & Peer Hull Kristensen, 2018. "Regulation under uncertainty: The coevolution of industry and regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 371-394, September.
    2. Per J. Agrell & Axel Gautier, 2012. "Rethinking Regulatory Capture," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. José Carlos Marques, 2019. "Private regulatory capture via harmonization: An analysis of global retailer regulatory intermediaries," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(2), pages 157-176, June.
    4. Guriev, Sergei, 2004. "Red tape and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 489-504, April.
    5. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-544, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    6. Elise S. Brezis, 2023. "Regulating the Revolving Door of Regulators: Legal vs. Ethical Issues," Economies, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-13, December.
    7. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2019. "The Rise of NGO Activism," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 183-212, November.
    8. Marcel Boyer & Tracy R. Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 2000. "Setting standards for credible compliance and law enforcement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(2), pages 319-340, May.
    9. Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 425-442.
    10. Ahmed Fouad El Haddad, 2024. "Beyond regulatory capture: Policy entrepreneurs' strategies in regulatory policies under authoritarianism," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 41(6), pages 961-984, November.
    11. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working Papers 2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    12. Strausz, Roland, 2005. "Honest certification and the threat of capture," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 45-62, February.
    13. De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca & Ponce, Jorge, 2018. "Flexible and mandatory banking supervision," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 86-104.
    14. Roland Strausz, 1997. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 497-518, December.
    15. Raffaele Fiocco & Mario Gilli, 2016. "Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 117(2), pages 93-116, March.
    16. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2011. "When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 720-731, June.
    17. Roberto Burguet, 2017. "Procurement Design with Corruption," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 315-341, May.
    18. Ganuza, Juan Jose & Gomez, Fernando, 2007. "Should we trust the gatekeepers?: Auditors' and lawyers' liability for clients' misconduct," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 96-109, March.
    19. Verdier, Thierry & Tressel, Thierry, 2014. "Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 9871, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Kuhn, Michael & Yan, Qianhui, 2006. "Quality monitoring, collusion and sub-contracting," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 70, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:14:y:2020:i:2:p:271-294. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1748-5991 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.