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Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements

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  • Wood, B. Dan

Abstract

A principal-agent perspective has been employed in recent studies to rediscover the importance of democratic hierarchies in shaping public bureaucratic outputs. I test the robustness of the hierarchy model for explaining outputs from an agency that has often been cast in the image of bureaucratic independence, the Environmental Protection Agency. Examining the effect of the Reagan presidency on EPA outputs for clean air, Box-Tiao models are constructed to explain shifts in the vigor of air pollution enforcements between 1977 and 1985. The analysis shows that the influence of elected institutions is limited when an agency has substantial bureaucratic resources and a zeal for their use. Moreover, under these conditions, bureaucracy can even move outputs in directions completely opposite from what a model of hierarchy would predict. The implication is that for some agencies it is necessary to give greater consideration to the agent in explaining implementation outcomes through time.

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  • Wood, B. Dan, 1988. "Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 213-234, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:01:p:213-234_08
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    Cited by:

    1. Luke Fowler & Chris Birdsall, 0. "Does the Primacy System Work? State versus Federal Implementation of the Clean Water Act," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 131-160.
    2. Ouyang, Hongwu Sam, 2006. "Agency problem, institutions, and technology policy: Explaining Taiwan's semiconductor industry development," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 1314-1328, November.
    3. Richard W. Waterman & B. Dan Wood, 1993. "Policy monitoring and policy analysis," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 685-699.
    4. Jodi L. Short, 2021. "The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 653-685, July.
    5. Maguire, Karen, 2012. "Prices or politics? The influence of markets and political party changes on oil and gas development in the United States," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 2013-2020.
    6. Amy McKay, 2011. "The decision to lobby bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 123-138, April.
    7. Benjamin Van Rooij & Gerald E. Fryxell & Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo & Wei Wang, 2013. "From support to pressure: The dynamics of social and governmental influences on environmental law enforcement in Guangzhou City, China," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(3), pages 321-347, September.
    8. Olson, Mary K, 1999. "Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, Regulation, and Industry Compliance," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 573-601, October.
    9. Vargas, Andrés & Sarmiento Erazo, Juan Pablo & Diaz, David, 2020. "Has Cost Benefit Analysis Improved Decisions in Colombia? Evidence from the Environmental Licensing Process," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    10. Matthew Eshbaugh‐Soha, 2008. "The Impact of Presidential Speeches on the Bureaucracy," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 89(1), pages 116-132, March.
    11. Stephen M. Shellman, 2006. "Leaders' Motivations and Actions: Explaining Government-Dissident Conflict-Cooperation Processes," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(1), pages 73-90, February.
    12. Garry Gray & Benjamin van Rooij, 2021. "Regulatory disempowerment: How enabling and controlling forms of power obstruct citizen‐based regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 800-821, July.
    13. Karen Maguire, 2013. "Drill Baby Drill? Political and Market Influences on Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing in the Western United States," Economics Working Paper Series 1401, Oklahoma State University, Department of Economics and Legal Studies in Business, revised Apr 2013.
    14. Aseem Prakash & Mary Kay Gugerty, 2010. "Trust but verify? Voluntary regulation programs in the nonprofit sector," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 22-47, March.
    15. Stephen M. Shellman & Brandon M. Stewart, 2007. "Political Persecution or Economic Deprivation? A Time-Series Analysis of Haitian Exodus, 1990—2004," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(2), pages 121-137, April.
    16. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "References," NBER Chapters, in: The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy, pages 205-222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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