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Payment of Universal Credit for couples in the UK: Challenges for reform from a gender perspective

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  • Marilyn Howard
  • Fran Bennett

Abstract

Universal Credit has been rolled out gradually in the United Kingdom since 2013 as one integrated means‐tested benefit replacing six different transfers with a single monthly payment. Previously, these benefits were awarded for distinct purposes and, for couples who claimed them, were potentially payable to different partners. Concerns about Universal Credit’s single payment include the opportunities it may create for facilitating domestic abuse, the fostering of more unequal power relations within couples, the reduction of financial autonomy for individuals, and the de‐labelling of benefit payments. This article explores debates about the prospects for individual payments to partners in couples of Universal Credit as a jointly assessed integrated means‐tested benefit, including different approaches emerging from the United Kingdom’s devolved governments (mainly Scotland and Northern Ireland). Whilst payment to each partner is likely to be more feasible where there are separate rather than integrated means‐tested benefits, it concludes that genuine financial autonomy for partners in couples is best pursued via individually based non‐means‐tested benefits. Le crédit universel a été mis en place progressivement au Royaume‐Uni depuis 2013, en tant que prestation intégrée sous condition de ressources, regroupant ainsi six transferts différents en un seul paiement mensuel. Auparavant, ces prestations étaient octroyées pour divers motifs et, pour les couples qui les demandaient, pouvaient être payées à différents partenaires. D’aucuns s’inquiètent que le paiement unique du crédit universel pourrait favoriser les violences domestiques, accroître l’inégalité des relations de pouvoir au sein du couple, réduire l’autonomie financière des individus et ne plus être considéré comme un paiement de prestations. Cet article examine les discussions portant sur les perspectives, au niveau des partenaires en couple, liées aux paiements individuels du crédit universel en tant que prestation intégrée sous condition de ressources ayant fait l’objet d’une évaluation conjointe, y compris les approches promues par les gouvernements décentralisés du Royaume‐Uni (principalement l’Écosse et l’Irlande du Nord). Bien que le paiement à chaque partenaire semble plus simple à mettre en place en tant que prestations sous condition de ressources séparées plutôt qu’intégrées, l’article conclut que des prestations individuelles sans conditions de ressources permettent de mieux garantir l’autonomie financière des partenaires en couple. La prestación universal se ha ido implantando gradualmente en el Reino Unido desde 2013 como una prestación integral sujeta a verificación de recursos, que sustituye seis transferencias de prestaciones distintas por un pago mensual único. Antes, estas prestaciones se concedían por distintos motivos, y en el caso de ser solicitadas por una pareja, podían llegar a pagarse a ambos miembros. El pago único de la prestación universal plantea varias preocupaciones, como el hecho de que podría favorecer el maltrato en el hogar, reforzar relaciones de poder más desiguales en las parejas, restar autonomía financiera a las personas y hacer que el pago de las prestaciones deje de estar etiquetado con un fin específico. En este artículo se estudian las posibilidades de conceder la prestación universal individualmente a uno de los miembros de la pareja como una prestación integral evaluada conjuntamente y sujeta a verificación de recursos, incluidos los distintos enfoques de las autoridades descentralizadas del Reino Unido, principalmente Irlanda del Norte y Escocia. Si bien realizar un pago a cada miembro de la pareja sea probablemente más viable en el caso de prestaciones sujetas a verificación de recursos por separado en lugar de integrales, se concluye que la mejor manera de lograr la verdadera autonomía financiera de los miembros de una pareja es mediante prestaciones individuales no sujetas a verificación de recursos. Im Vereinigten Königreich wurden ab 2013 schrittweise Universal Credits als einkommensgeprüfte Kombinationsleistung eingeführt, um sechs verschiedene Transferleistungen in eine einzige monatliche Zahlung zu bündeln. Die früheren Leistungen wurden für unterschiedliche Zwecke vergeben. Paare, die diese beantragten, erhielten sie je nachdem an den einen oder anderen Partner ausgezahlt. Bei der neuen Einmalzahlung des Universal Credit bestand jedoch die Sorge, dass dadurch häusliche Gewalt und ungleichere Machtverhältnisse innerhalb der Paare gefördert, die finanzielle Autonomie von Einzelpersonen verringert und die Leistungszahlungen nicht mehr individuell gestaltet werden. Dieser Artikel resümiert die Debatte um eine mögliche individuelle Auszahlung des Universal Credit an die Lebenspartner im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen, einkommensgeprüften Leistung, wobei auch unterschiedliche Ansätze in den eigenständigen Regierungseinheiten des Vereinigten Königreichs (hauptsächlich Schottland und Nordirland) diskutiert werden. Die Leistung könnte zwar wahrscheinlich leichter einzeln an die Partner ausgezahlt werden, wenn es sich um getrennte einkommensgeprüfte Leistungen und nicht um eine gemeinsame einkommensgeprüfte Leistung handelte. Die Schlussfolgerung lautet jedoch, dass eine echte finanzielle Autonomie für die einzelnen Partner in Paaren am besten erreicht wird, wenn die Leistungen zwar individuell ausgezahlt werden, aber nicht einkommensgeprüft sind. Начиная с 2013 года в Соединённом Королевстве постепенно расширяется масштаб программы выплат единой ссуды. Это ежемесячное пособие назначается по результатам проверки нуждаемости и перечисляется единым платежом вместо шести разных денежных выплат. В прошлом пособия предоставлялись для разных целей и, если заявление подавалось от имени супружеской пары, могли выплачиваться одному из супругов. Единовременная выплата единой ссуды вызывает озабоченность в связи с тем, что она может провоцировать бытовое насилие, принуждать к неравенству и доминированию одного из супругов, ограничивать финансовую независимость и подрывать адресность выплат денежных пособий. В статье раскрывается суть дебатов о возможности разделения выплаты единой ссуды супругам по результатам обоюдной оценки нуждаемости и рассматриваются разные подходы, вытекающие из передачи властных полномочий на местный уровень (в основном в Шотландии и Северной Ирландии). Хотя раздельные выплаты каждому из супругов, вероятно, легче осуществить в форме раздельных, а не объединённых, пособий, назначаемых по результатам проверки нуждаемости, авторы статьи заключают, что подлинная финансовая независимость обоих супругов оптимально обеспечивается индивидуальными пособиями, назначаемыми не по результатам проверки нуждаемости. 英国的夫妇统一福利金给付:性别视角下的改革挑战 玛里琳·霍华德(Marilyn Howard)和弗兰·贝内特(Fran Bennett) 统一福利金(Universal Card)自2013年起在英国逐步推出, 是一项需要经济情况调查的综合福利, 用一次性按月给付替代了六种不同的转移支付。过去, 根据不同目的授予福利金, 夫妇申请, 可能给付给不同的伴侣。也存在对统一福利金一次性给付的担忧, 包括可能助长家庭虐待, 加剧夫妻内部权力关系的不平等, 减少个人财务自主权以及福利给付去标签化。文章探讨了由向个人给付转为基于联合评估、综合经济情况调查的夫妻统一福利金的前景展望, 包括英国下放政府(主要是苏格兰和北爱尔兰)采用的不同方法。尽管进行单独经济情况调查而非共同调查, 并对每位伴侣给付福利金更加可行, 但文章也得出结论, 基于个人的非经济情况调查福利能更好地促进夫妻中的伴侣实现真正的财务自主。 دفع ائتمان شامل لفائدة الأزواج في المملكة المتحدة: التحديات التي تواجه عملية الإصلاح من منظور جنساني Marilyn Howard و Fran Bennett . ويستعرض هذا المقال المناقشات بشأن التوقعات الخاصة بالمدفوعات الفردية للائتمان الشامل المستحقة للشريكين كواحد من المنافع المتكاملة المستندة إلى الدخل المقيّمة بصورة مشتركة، بما يشمل النهج المختلفة التي وضعتها الحكومات المفوضة بالصلاحيات (لا سيما اسكتلاندا وشمال إيرلندا). وفي حين يرجح أن يكون الدفع لكل شريك قابلاً أكثر للتطبيق عندما يتعلق الأمر بمنافع منفصلة عوضاً عن منافع متكاملة مستندة إلى الدخل، ويخلُص المقال إلى أن الاستقلالية المالية الحقيقية للشريكين تُحقَّق بشكل أفضل عبر المنافع الفردية المستندة إلى الدخل. .المنافع مدفوعات تشويهويُطبَّق الائتمان الشامل تدريجياً في المملكة المتحدة منذ عام 2013 كواحد من المنافع المتكاملة المستندة إلى الدخل التي تجمع مختلف التحويلات الستة بدفع مبلغ شهري واحد. وفي السابق، كانت هذه المنافع تُمنح لأغراض محددة وللأزواج الذين يطلبونها، وكان يُحتمل أن تُدفع لشركاء مختلفين. وتشمل الشواغل المتعلقة بالدفع الواحد للائتمان الشامل الفرص التي يمكن أن تنشأ لتسهيل العنف المنزلي، وتعزيز انعدام المساواة في السلطة داخل الأزواج والحد من الاستقلالية المالية للأفراد، Pagamento do Crédito Universal para casais no Reino Unido: desafios para reforma de uma perspectiva de gênero Marilyn Howard e Fran Bennett O Crédito Universal foi lançado gradualmente no Reino Unido a partir de 2013 como um benefício integrado e sujeito à prova de recursos, substituindo seis transferências diferentes por um único pagamento mensal. Anteriormente, esses benefícios eram concedidos para finalidades distintas e, para os casais que os reivindicavam, eram potencialmente pagos aos diferentes parceiros. Os problemas com o pagamento único do Crédito Universal incluem as oportunidades que podem criar para facilitar o abuso doméstico, a promoção de relações de poder desiguais entre os casais, a redução da autonomia financeira dos indivíduos e a eliminação da rotulagem como pagamentos de benefícios. Este artigo explora os debates sobre as perspectivas de pagamentos individuais do Crédito Universal aos parceiros de um casal como um benefício integrado, sujeito à prova de recursos e avaliado em conjunto, incluindo abordagens distintas de governos descentralizados do Reino Unido (principalmente Escócia e Irlanda do Norte). Embora o pagamento a cada parceiro seja provavelmente mais viável quando há benefícios separados e não integrados, sujeitos à prova de recursos, a conclusão é de que a real autonomia financeira de parceiros em casais apresenta melhor desempenho por meio de benefícios baseados individualmente e não sujeitos à prova de recursos.

Suggested Citation

  • Marilyn Howard & Fran Bennett, 2020. "Payment of Universal Credit for couples in the UK: Challenges for reform from a gender perspective," International Social Security Review, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(4), pages 75-96, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:intssr:v:73:y:2020:i:4:p:75-96
    DOI: 10.1111/issr.12251
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frances Woolley, 2004. "Why Pay Child Benefits to Mothers?," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 30(1), pages 47-69, March.
    2. Paul Fisher, 2016. "British tax credit simplification, the intra-household distribution of income and family consumption," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 444-464.
    3. Fran Bennett & Jerome De Henau & Sirin Sung, 2010. "Within-Household Inequalities Across Classes? Management and Control of Money," Chapters, in: Jacqueline Scott & Rosemary Crompton & Clare Lyonette (ed.), Gender Inequalities in the 21st Century, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Fabio Veras Soares & Elydia Silva, 2010. "Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Gender Vulnerabilities: Case Studies of Brazil, Chile and Colombia," Working Papers 69, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.
    5. Fran Bennett, 2002. "Gender implications of current social security reforms," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 23(4), pages 559-584, December.
    6. Shelly J. Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak & Terence J. Wales, 1997. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(3), pages 463-480.
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