IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/iecrev/v62y2021i1p277-293.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Face Value Of Arguments With And Without Manipulation

Author

Listed:
  • Mike Felgenhauer
  • Fangya Xu

Abstract

A sender wishes to persuade a receiver with a (surprising) result that challenges the prior belief. The result stems either from sequential private experimentation or manipulation. The incentive to experiment and to manipulate depends on the quality threshold for persuasion. Higher thresholds make it harder to find a surprising outcome via experimentation and may encourage manipulation. Suppose there are observable nonmanipulable and manipulable research methods. For the decision quality, the quality threshold for persuasion for nonmanipulable methods should be higher than for manipulable methods. We discuss philosophy of science implications, such as field contingent quality standards and P‐value adjustments.

Suggested Citation

  • Mike Felgenhauer & Fangya Xu, 2021. "The Face Value Of Arguments With And Without Manipulation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 277-293, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:62:y:2021:i:1:p:277-293
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12479
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12479
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/iere.12479?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2001. "Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 158-173, August.
    2. Emeric Henry, 2009. "Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1036-1064, July.
    3. Philippe Aghion & Mathias Dewatripont & Jeremy C. Stein, 2008. "Academic freedom, private‐sector focus, and the process of innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 617-635, September.
    4. Mike Felgenhauer & Petra Loerke, 2017. "Bayesian Persuasion With Private Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(3), pages 829-856, August.
    5. Emeric Henry & Marco Ottaviani, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 911-955, March.
    6. Sandeep Baliga & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2016. "Torture and the Commitment Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(4), pages 1406-1439.
    7. Abel Brodeur & Mathias Lé & Marc Sangnier & Yanos Zylberberg, 2016. "Star Wars: The Empirics Strike Back," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 1-32, January.
    8. Mike Felgenhauer, 2019. "Endogenous Persuasion with Costly Verification," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(3), pages 1054-1087, July.
    9. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    10. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 36-44, Spring.
    11. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iatr74eao is not listed on IDEAS
    12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iatr74eao is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Mike Felgenhauer & Petra Loerke, 2017. "Bayesian Persuasion With Private Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58, pages 829-856, August.
    14. Scott Stern, 2004. "Do Scientists Pay to Be Scientists?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(6), pages 835-853, June.
    15. Emeric Henry, 2009. "Disclosure of research results: the cost of proving your honesty," Post-Print hal-01023670, HAL.
    16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1gr6n3t28b94tafji6op8tlqs1 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Herresthal, C., 2017. "Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1712, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2021. "Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 400-408.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2021. "Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 400-408.
    2. Mike Felgenhauer & Petra Loerke, 2017. "Bayesian Persuasion With Private Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(3), pages 829-856, August.
    3. Mike Felgenhauer & Elisabeth Schulte, 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 74-105, November.
    4. Mike Felgenhauer, 2019. "Endogenous Persuasion with Costly Verification," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(3), pages 1054-1087, July.
    5. Dahm, Matthias & González, Paula & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2018. "The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 21-32.
    6. Kiri, Bralind & Lacetera, Nicola & Zirulia, Lorenzo, 2018. "Above a swamp: A theory of high-quality scientific production," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 827-839.
    7. Federico Echenique & Kevin He, 2024. "Screening p -hackers: Dissemination noise as bait," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 121(21), pages 2400787121-, May.
    8. Herresthal, Claudia, 2022. "Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    9. Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Yichuan Lou, 2023. "Private Experimentation, Data Truncation, and Verifiable Disclosure," Papers 2305.04231, arXiv.org.
    11. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
    12. Herresthal, C., 2017. "Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1712, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    13. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    14. Alfredo Di Tillio & Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2021. "Strategic Sample Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 911-953, March.
    15. Vasudha Jain & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Whose Bias?," Papers 2111.10335, arXiv.org.
    16. Alexander Frankel & Maximilian Kasy, 2022. "Which Findings Should Be Published?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-38, February.
    17. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
    18. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021. "Cross-Examination," Working Papers of BETA 2021-40, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    19. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011. "Learning more by doing less," Working Papers 2012-1, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    20. Daniel Stone, 2011. "A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 397-424, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:62:y:2021:i:1:p:277-293. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.