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Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence

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  • Herresthal, C.

Abstract

This paper contrasts a decision maker's payoff under public and private information acquisition by a biased advisor. Both players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but differ in how they trade off the loss from errors. The advisor can sequentially acquire informative test outcomes. If acquisition is private he decides in the final period which realizations to verifiably disclose. If players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned, the decision maker is weakly better off under private rather than public information acquisition. The effect on the advisor's payoff depends on the direction of his bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Herresthal, C., 2017. "Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1712, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1712
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    File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1712.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alfredo Di Tillio & Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2021. "Strategic Sample Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 911-953, March.
    2. Mike Felgenhauer & Fangya Xu, 2021. "The Face Value Of Arguments With And Without Manipulation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 277-293, February.
    3. Bobtcheff, Catherine & Mariotti, Thomas & Levy, Raphaël, 2021. "Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner’s) curse," TSE Working Papers 21-1202, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Vasudha Jain & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Whose Bias?," Papers 2111.10335, arXiv.org.
    5. Min, Daehong, 2023. "Screening for experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 73-100.
    6. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2021. "Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 400-408.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    endogenous information acquisition; veriable disclosure; strategic experimentation; endogenous information acquisition; verifiable disclosure; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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