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Paying patients to comply: an economic analysis

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  • Antonio Giuffrida
  • Hugh Gravelle

Abstract

A significant proportion of patients do not complete prescribed treatment or do not follow medical advice. There is evidence that financial incentives can increase compliance. We present a model of patient compliance and use it to examine the circumstances in which patients should be paid to comply with treatment and discuss the factors determining the optimal level of payment to patients. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Giuffrida & Hugh Gravelle, 1998. "Paying patients to comply: an economic analysis," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(7), pages 569-579, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:7:y:1998:i:7:p:569-579
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(1998110)7:7<569::AID-HEC376>3.0.CO;2-S
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    1. repec:zbw:rwirep:0373 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ansgar Wübker, 2014. "Explaining variations in breast cancer screening across European countries," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 15(5), pages 497-514, June.
    3. Boris Augurzky & Arndt Reichert & Christoph M. Schmidt, 2012. "The Effect of a Bonus Program for Preventive Health Behavior on Health Expenditures," Ruhr Economic Papers 0373, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    4. repec:zbw:rwirep:0370 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Wu, Stephen, 2003. "Sickness and preventive medical behavior," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 675-689, July.
    6. Augurzky, Boris & Reichert, Arndt R. & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2012. "The Effect of a Bonus Program for Preventive Health Behavior on Health Expenditures," Ruhr Economic Papers 373, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    7. Eline Aas, 2009. "Pecuniary compensation increases participation in screening for colorectal cancer," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(3), pages 337-354, March.
    8. Ansgar Wübker, 2012. "Explaining Variations in Breast Cancer Screening Across European Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0370, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    9. Klaus Mann & Michael Möcker & Joachim Grosser, 2019. "Adherence to long-term prophylactic treatment: microeconomic analysis of patients’ behavior and the impact of financial incentives," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 1-10, December.
    10. Byrne, Margaret M. & Thompson, Peter, 2001. "Screening and preventable illness," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 1077-1088, November.

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