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Anticipatory ex ante moral hazard and the effect of medicare on prevention

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  • Laure B. de Preux

Abstract

This paper extends the ex ante moral hazard model to allow healthy lifestyles to reduce the probability of illness in future periods, so that current preventive behaviour may be affected by anticipated changes in future insurance coverage. In the United States, Medicare is offered to almost all the population at the age of 65. We use nine waves of the US Health and Retirement Study to compare lifestyles before and after 65 of those insured and not insured pre 65. The double‐robust approach, which combines propensity score and regression, is used to compare trends in lifestyle (physical activity, smoking, drinking) of the two groups before and after receiving Medicare, using both difference‐in‐differences and difference‐in‐differences‐in‐differences. There is no clear effect of the receipt of Medicare or its anticipation on alcohol consumption nor smoking behaviour, but the previously uninsured do reduce physical activity just before receiving Medicare. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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  • Laure B. de Preux, 2011. "Anticipatory ex ante moral hazard and the effect of medicare on prevention," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(9), pages 1056-1072, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:20:y:2011:i:9:p:1056-1072
    DOI: 10.1002/hec.1778
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    3. Chen Chen & Gordon Guoen Liu & Tangxin Wang & Jialong Tan, 2023. "Ex‐ante moral hazard and health insurance: Evidence from China's urban residence basic medical insurance scheme," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(11), pages 2516-2534, November.
    4. Christophe Courbage & Christina Nicolas, 2021. "On the Association between Insurance Deductibles and Prevention Behaviour: Evidence from the Swiss Health System," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-15, April.
    5. Oney, Melissa, 2018. "The effect of health insurance on sexual health: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act's dependent coverage mandate," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 20-27.
    6. Abraham Abebe Asfaw, 2019. "The effect of prescription drug insurance on health behavior: Evidence from Medicare Part D," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 403-418, March.
    7. Fichera, Eleonora & Banks, James & Siciliani, Luigi & Sutton, Matt, 2018. "Does patient health behaviour respond to doctor effort?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 225-251.
    8. Wanyue Dong & Jianmin Gao & Zhongliang Zhou & Ruhai Bai & Yue Wu & Min Su & Chi Shen & Xin Lan & Xiao Wang, 2018. "Effects of China’s urban basic health insurance on preventive care service utilization and health behaviors: Evidence from the China Health and Nutrition Survey," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(12), pages 1-14, December.
    9. Jeffrey T Kullgren & Kevin G Volpp & Daniel Polsky, 2013. "Are the Healthy Behaviors of US High-Deductible Health Plan Enrollees Driven by People Who Chose These Plans? Smoking as a Case Study," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(2), pages 1-6, February.
    10. Eleonora Fichera & James Banks & Luigi Siciliani & Matt Sutton, 2017. "Does Patient Health Behaviour respond to Doctor’s Effort?," Department of Economics Working Papers 62/17, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    11. Aistov, Andrey V. (Аистов, Андрей) & Aleksandrova, Ekaterina A. (Александрова, Екатерина), 2018. "Ex Post Moral Hazard in Private Health Insurance [Постконтрактный Оппортунизм На Рынке Добровольного Медицинского Страхования]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 3, pages 148-181, June.
    12. Joachim Marti & Michael R. Richards, 2017. "Smoking Response to Health and Medical Spending Changes and the Role of Insurance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 305-320, March.
    13. Brandon Pope & Abhijit Deshmukh & Andrew Johnson & James Rohack, 2014. "Multilateral Contracting And Prevention," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4), pages 397-409, April.
    14. Ghislando, S & Manachotphong, W & Perego, VME, 2013. "The impact of Universal Health Coverage on healthcare consumption and risky behaviours: evidence from Thailand," Working Papers 11200, Imperial College, London, Imperial College Business School.
    15. Darius Erlangga & Marc Suhrcke & Shehzad Ali & Karen Bloor, 2019. "The impact of public health insurance on health care utilisation, financial protection and health status in low- and middle-income countries: A systematic review," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(8), pages 1-20, August.

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